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   Summary 
Land is a very important factor of production in an agricultural developing country like 
Bangladesh. Land reform ordinance 1984 was formulated and declared by the government of 
Bangladesh in due respect for the improvement of agricultural production as well as the 
proper utilization of agricultural lands in the country by properly addressing the tenancy issue 
of share cropped land. The academic contribution of this thesis lies in evaluation of 
implementation and agricultural production aspect of this land reform ordinance 1984, which 
is a very important issue in the national perspective of Bangladesh. The aim of this thesis is to 
analyze the various aspects of land tenure arrangements on agricultural production based on 
with and without implementation of land reform ordinance 1984. The study area was selected 
at Basail Upzila (sub- district) of Tangail district in Bangladesh, as the farmers of this Upazila 
have location advantages in farming those can represent the various regional characteristics of 
land tenure arrangements in the country, including cropping patterns and other concerned 
issues in farming. Other related aspects those affect on land tenure and agricultural production 
were also assessed. Data were collected from 150 respondents of equally 50 from each 
category of owner, owner cum tenant and tenant farmers. This data were collected from 
January to March, 2013 by stratified random sampling technique based on the cultivated crops 
in a cropping year. Then the collected data were analyzed by statistical analytical software 
Stata 13. There are two core chapters (Chapter 5 and 6 ) have been incorporated in this thesis. 
These include analyses of various aspects of agricultural production, according to land tenure 
arrangements. This Thesis has attempted to locate the most relevant theoretical models to 
explain the econometric outcomes in the relevant chapters. The first core chapter (chapter 5) 
attempts to analyze the agricultural production in the different land tenure arrangements of 
Basail Upazila of Tangail district in Bangladesh. This study shows that output sharing is 
conducted according to this legal provision of land reform ordinance 1984 but input cost 
sharing are not practiced accordingly in share cropped land. Those lead the tenant farmers 
(share croppers) in lack of proper incentive. That is revealed in benefit cost ratio and analysis 
of variance of net revenue of the farmers. From this analysis of variance, it is found that there 
is a statistically significant difference from zero among the net revenue of owner, owner cum 
tenant and tenant farmers. Again, this benefit cost ratio in owner cum tenant mortgaged land 
is higher than that of both the owner cum tenant or tenant share cropped lands. This indicates 
the potentiality to transform share cropped land into mortgaged land for the cultivators. The 
second core chapter (chapter 6) identifies the technical efficiency of different categories of 
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farmers. From this study it is found that there is a statistically significant difference from zero 
among the technical efficiency of various categories of cultivated land of the farmers. This 
technical efficiency becomes higher in share cropped lands if input cost is shared by the land 
owner according to the legal provision of land reform ordinance 1984. It is also found 
significantly positive influence of credit on this technical efficiency.  
From the above mentioned various analysis, it can be holistically detected that, proper 
implementation of land reform ordinance 1984 is needed for achieving the proper incentive in 
cultivation of share cropped land, enhancement of technical efficiency, Profitability in crop 
cultivation for the cultivators as well as for the better outcome of agricultural production in 
Bangladesh.  
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Preface 
 
This Thesis aims to study various aspects of land tenure in the utilization of agricultural lands 
in the country. This study was conducted based on household level survey data collected in 
January - Mach, 2013.In doing so, this study starts with a general background of the study 
chapter, which introduces research problem and its objectives. Chapter 2 illustrates literature 
review, including agricultural land issues in Bangladesh. The review depicts the land issues 
scenario in Bangladesh over time. Chapter 3 is on analytical flow and methodology. This 
chapter includes an analytical flow, study area, linking stochastic frontier model in the flow, 
source of data, sampling technique and data analysis those were used in this study. Chapter 5 
is on agricultural production in the different land tenure arrangements of Basail Upazila of 
Tangail district in Bangladesh. This chapter also presents a detailed study on profitability of 
different crop cultivation in farming aspect. The result of this chapter has been published in 
the Bangladesh journal of agricultural research as an article. Chapter 6 is on Technical 
efficiency of different categories of farmers. The outcome of this chapter has been accepted as 
an article in the journal of Bangladesh agricultural research. The finding of this chapter also 
has been presented in the 8th Asian Society of Agricultural Economists (ASAE) conference. 
The outcome of eco-friendly aspect of the study has been submitted to the Journal of 
Bangladesh Development Studies (BIDS) to publish as an article. Lastly, chapter 7 consists of 
a summary conclusion and recommendation. This study will be helpful for the government of 
Bangladesh to take appropriate measures for the better utilization of agricultural lands as well 
as agricultural production in Bangladesh.  
Lastly, I want to pay my heartiest thanks to my main academic advisor Professor Maharjan 
K.L., academic advisor Professor Kaneko S., Academic advisor Associate Professor Seki 
Koki, academic advisor Associate Professor Kawamura K., other concerned professors of 
IDEC, Hiroshima University and colleagues. 
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Chapter1. General Background of the Study 
1.1 Introduction 
Bangladesh is an agricultural developing country. In which 52% of the people derive their 
livelihood from agriculture. Agriculture is the major dominating sector and this sector 
contributes 23.50% of the gross domestic product (GDP) of the country. Again, the 
contribution of the crop sub sector to GDP is 13.44% in the country (BBS, 2011). Rice and 
fish compost of main diet of Bangladeshi people and fish is the major source of animal 
protein for the majority of the common people of the country. This fishery sub-sector 
contributes 75 % of the daily per capita animal protein intake, 8 % of agricultural GDP, 4% 
of total GDP and 9% of foreign exchange earnings (Chowdhury and Maharjan, 2001). 
Land tenure refers to the arrangements (rules, institution and process) through which people 
gain legitimate access to land. Proper land tenure arrangements are perceived an important 
strategy for input use and agricultural production in the utilization of land resources. The 
policies those are related to the land tenure for the improvement of agricultural production as 
well as proper use of agricultural lands in the country are termed as land tenure policies and 
land tenure arrangements are administered by these land tenure policies. Agriculture plays a 
vital role in contributing these dietary issues from prevailing different land tenure 
arrangements in the country as well as contributing in the national economy. In Bangladesh, 
41% of the total people are living below the poverty line and 80% of the total people are 
living in the rural area where the incidence of poverty is noticeable (Ahmed, 2012). Poverty 
is concentrated mostly in households, which do not have assets in Bangladesh. Like many 
other developing countries - land is the single most important asset for the livelihood of 
people in Bangladesh and tenancy arrangements are commonly used in order to improve 
access of land for the poor. This thesis explores agricultural production in the different land 
tenure arrangements based on these various tenancy arrangements among different categories 
of farmers.  
The current agricultural policies are focused on economic restructuring for attaining proper 
agricultural development. This provides the rationale for this research to study land and 
livelihood based on the agricultural production according to different land tenure 
arrangements. It is important to highlight that livelihood strategies among the farmers in the 
rural Bangladesh are influenced by land tenure rules which are informal and based on 
customary rules. That is why, how formal rules and policies interact and their impacts are 
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important to identify the drawbacks as well as taking proper measures for attaining the 
potential agricultural production having proper agricultural development in Bangladesh. 
1.2 Farming Categories in the Study Area 
There are three farming categories prevailing in Bangladesh 
a. Owner farming  
b. Owner cum Tenant farming  
c. Tenant farming 
Tenancy Arrangements in the Country 
Among these farming categories the following tenancy arrangements are observed in the 
country:  
i. Share cropping 
ii. Leasing (Fixed renting) 
iii. Mortgaging 
1.3 Present Land Tenure Scenario in Bangladesh 
According to the national census, presently the percentages of owner, owner cum tenant and 
tenant farmers in Bangladesh are 65%, 22% and 13% respectively (BBS, 2011). But these 
percentages in the study area are 48%, 28% and 24% respectively (DAE, 2013). Again 
among these tenancy arrangements crop sharing is practiced only in the case of share 
cropping arrangements.  
1.4 Cultivated Crops in the Study Area 
Rice is the staple food in the Bangladeshi diet. In getting this staple source of cereal; High 
Yielding Variety Boro (HYV Boro), Transplanting Aman (T. Aman), Broadcasting Aman (B. 
Aman) and other varieties of rice are cultivated by the farmers. But HYV Boro, T. Aman and 
B. Aman are cultivated by the majority of the farmers. Besides this, mustard, jute, pulses, 
wheat and vegetables are cultivated by the minor groups of the farmers. 
1.5 Paddy cum Fish Farming 
Paddy cum fish farming is one of the most recent ideas of the farmers. Farmers are practicing 
this paddy cum fish farming in utilizing highest and best use of scarce land resource in their 
crop cultivation. Incorporating this innovative pattern of paddy cum fish farming with their 
major cultivated crops, farmers are getting extra income from this entrepreneurship as well as 
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this is helpful for the improvement of the paddy yield also. That is supported by conducted 
study that paddy cum fish farming systems can improve paddy yields by as much as 10- 20 
per cent in Bangladesh, possibly due to better mulching, fertilization of soils through fish 
waste, and better weed control (Dey et al., 2012). Farmers are practicing this paddy cum fish 
farming in the study area in the following three distinct patterns to maximize their net 
revenue and best utilization of their resources: 
1.5.1 Paddy cum Fish Farming with T. Aman 
This form of paddy cum fish farming is practiced during T. Aman season in cultivating T. 
Aman along with fish in the T. Aman paddy field. There is a positive externality in this type 
of paddy cum fish farming. Mulching and fish waste provided by the fish is helpful for the 
improvement of paddy yield again; generated feed supplied from the T. Aman cultivation is 
helpful to increase fish production also. 
1.5.2 Paddy cum Fish Farming with B. Aman 
B. Aman is flood tolerant Local Variety paddy (LV paddy), this B. Aman can be cultivated 
even in deep water. In cultivation of fish along with B. Aman in the B. Aman paddy field, 
both B. Aman and fish are mutually benefitted from each other like above mentioned paddy 
cum fish farming with T. Aman also. 
1.5.3 Paddy cum Fish Farming in the HYV Boro Field 
Paddy cum fish farming in the HYV Boro field is different than those both paddy cum fish 
farming with T. Aman or, paddy cum fish farming with B. Aman. In this paddy cum fish 
farming system, HYV Boro is cultivated in dry season and fish is cultivated in the wet season 
to make proper use of land. In this paddy cum fish farming in the HYV Boro field, fish waste 
is beneficial for soil nutrient; again produced fish meal from used chemical fertilizer in HYV 
Boro cultivation is helpful for fish production. Both HYV Boro as well as fish is getting 
benefit of positive externalities from this practice also. All of these forms of paddy cum fish 
farming are practiced by the farmers according their geo- physical viabilities.      
1.6 The Economy of Bangladesh 
Bangladesh is a low- lying country located in South Asia. This country is formed by a deltaic 
plain area having surrounded by Ganges (Padma), Brahmaputra (Jamuna) Meghna River and 
lots of their tributaries. This country has highly fertile soil, but vulnerable to flood, drought 
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and other natural calamities. This country has a sub-tropical monsoon climate constitutes of 
seasonal rainfall, moderately warm temperature and high humidity which is very favorable 
for agricultural production. Bangladesh is the seventh   largest country in the world in terms 
of population; and its population density is more than 1,229 people per square kilometer 
(Ahmed, 2012).  
1.7 Land and Population Scenario in South Asia 
There are eight countries in South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC).  
This SAARC was formed in 1980 for the regional co-operation in attaining the economic 
development among these countries of Bangladesh, India, Bhutan, Pakistan, Sri-Lanka, 
Maldives and Nepal. Later, Afghanistan also joined the association.  
It is found based on the study (Ahmed, 2012) that agriculture sector contributes for the 4th 
highest (52%) for the employment opportunity in Bangladesh, though the per capita land is 
lowest (0.12 ha) among these SAARC countries. This study indicates the necessity of proper 
land use arrangements in Bangladesh.  
1.8 Statement of Problem 
There are various land use pattern prevailing in the country. This land use pattern affects 
gross revenue per hectare by using the efficient use of inputs under different land tenure 
arrangements. Considering the tenancy status of farm lands in Bangladesh, 58% of the land is 
operated by owner, 40% by owner cum tenant and 2% by tenant farmers. Moreover, about 
one-fifth of the total operated area is under some kind of tenancy arrangements with share 
cropping covering about one-half of the land (Tenaw et al., 2009). Owned land, mortgaged 
land, leased land and share cropped land are cultivated by these farming categories in 
different patterns. Cultivators get rationality in cultivation of their land having proper 
incentive in cultivating all of these types of land except this share cropped land. Because, 
only in the share cropped land cultivators need to provide half of the produced crop to the 
land owner according to the legal provision of land reform ordinance 1984 but input cost is 
not shared accordingly. That leads them lack of proper incentive. Land reform ordinance 
1984 was undertaken to ascertain this incentive for the share cropped land in sharing 50:50 
input cost between land owner and tenant farmers for all the input except labor. 
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1.9 Rationale 
Favorable cultivation process is a pre-requisite for adopting proper varieties and input use. In 
cultivation of high yielding varieties, if this input cost is shared by the land owner then the 
adaptation rate becomes higher.  But if this input cost is not shared by the land owner then 
this adaptation rate becomes lower in case of share cropping arrangements. But this 
adaptation rate becomes highest in case of fixed rental arrangements. Again, there is a 
potentiality of technological transformation in Bangladesh agriculture, but in share cropping 
rental arrangements if this input cost is not shared properly by the land owner, then that share 
cropping arrangements work as a drawback of this potential technological transformation 
(Hossain, 1991). 
1.10 Objectives of the Study 
The overall objective is to study agriculture production under different land tenure 
arrangements in Bangladesh. The specific objectives are as follows; 
i. To explain different land tenure arrangements in Bangladesh. 
ii. To analyze revenue from agriculture production, according to land tenure 
arrangements in Basail Upazila. 
iii. To assess technical efficiency of agriculture production, according to land tenure 
arrangements in Basail Upazila. 
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Chapter2. Literature Review 
2.1 Land reform measures in Bangladesh 
2.1.1 Introduction  
Bangladesh became independent in 16 December, 1971. The depiction of distribution of land 
ownership in 1979 was 2% households owned 25% of land, 10% households owned 53% of 
land and the rest 88% households owned only 22% of land in the country.  There was 
absolutely unequal distribution. As a result 80% households enjoyed 20% of income and rest 
of 20% households enjoyed 80% income in 1980. In the end of nineteenth century tenure 
complexity reached its highest, 10-15 layers occupy the intermediary interest who all shared 
the peasant surplus. In this scenario, poorest and upper richer group increase and middle 
income group decreases (Ullah, 1996). 
2.1.2 Ceiling of upper limit of land holding in the different land reform measures 
 After independence, proper measures were taken for the improvement of agricultural 
production as well as proper use of agricultural lands in the country. These measures were 
taken by adapting necessary strategies to establish security and incentive measures by 
materializing the claim of Tebhaga (Three shares) movement in tenancy system. In addition 
deregulation of input supply policy and introducing agricultural credit programs were taken 
by the government of Bangladesh (Fujita, 2010). In this background, Land reform measures 
were taken in Bangladesh determining the ceiling of upper limit 13.36 hectare (100 Bigha) in 
land reform measure in 1972 and 8.016 hectare (60 Bigha) in land reform ordinance 
1984.This land reform ordinance was formulated and declared in 1984 for the security and 
incentive in tenancy system as well as better utilization of agricultural lands in the country.  
Before this land reform ordinance 1984 tenancy right was not addressed properly, measures 
were taken to improve this tenancy right as well as betterment of agricultural production for 
the better utilization of agricultural lands in the country by this land reform ordinance 1984.  
Before introducing this land reform ordinance 1984,though there was an upper limit of 
ceiling in land holding but this restriction was not implemented properly due to the 
malpractice of owner farmers. They registered their land in the disguise name of their 
relatives, actually they were the real owner and they were holding land violating this upper 
limit by adapting this malpractice. 
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 As a result, this initiative was not effective. In this respect, integrated proper measures were 
taken   by the land reform ordinance 1984 in proper utilization of agricultural lands in the 
country (LRB, 1982).   
2.1.3 Land reform ordinance 1984  
2.1.3.1Background of land reform ordinance 1984  
2.1.3.1.1British regime (Before 1947):  
Permanent settlement act was enacted during this period in 1793 for collecting tax as well as 
for the vested interest of the British government in the name of land administration and land 
management. Zamindary (Big land lord) system was introduced by this act. Before this act, 
farmers were the owner of the land but after the formation of Zamindary system, Zaminders 
were the owner of the land and cultivators were tenant. In this zamindary system, Zaminders 
were authorized to collect the tax and they were also authorized to increase the tax according 
to their desire (Islam, 1985). 
They provided the collected tax to government after deducting the certain percentage for 
them to maintain the tax collection as well as administrative expenses. As a result, zaminders 
were used to increase this percentage of tax frequently for their own interest without 
considering the interest for tenants (Islam, 1985). 
Moreover, Zaminders were not interested to take any initiative for the improvement of land. 
Due to this tenants were exploited, suppressed and deprived from even their legal right during 
this Zamindary system.  
2.1.3.1.2 Pakistan regime (1947- 1971):  
Zamindary system was abolished in 1950 by East Bengal state acquisition and tenancy act 
after the recommendation of Floud commission report. After the dissolve of Zamindary 
system peasant became direct tenant under government and got property right of their land. 
Though these initiatives were taken but the outcome was little. Centralization of capital was 
an obstacle in agriculture. That leads the small scale peasant farmers in secondary occupation. 
Land ownership pattern changed gradually in a capitalistic trend. 
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2.1.3.1.3 Bangladesh regime (After 1971):  
Bangladesh became independent in 16 December, 1971.After independence, proper measures 
were taken for the improvement of agricultural production by adapting the required measures 
to establish security and incentive strategy in materializing the claim of Tebhaga movement 
in tenancy system by land reform ordinance 1984 in consideration of drawbacks in required 
land use, but proper implementation is needed. 
2.1.3.2 Objectives of land reform ordinance 1984 
The objectives of this ordinance were to introduce the reform of the law related to land tenure, 
land holding and land transfer with the view to maximize production and ensuring better 
relationship between land owner and tenant farmers. 
2.1.3.3 Features of land reform ordinance 1984 
The main features of land reform ordinance 1984 are as follows: 
(i) The upper ceiling of land holding is 8.016 hectare; 
(ii) Tenancy right of rented land must be at least for 5 years; 
(iii) The upper ceiling of rented land is 2.004 hectare; 
(iv)Tenant will get the collateral right for the rented land; 
(v) Tenant will get Preference right to buy the land; 
(vi) Ensuring Inherited right in tenancy; 
(vii) Tebagha system in output sharing; 
 
2.1.3.4 Necessity of restriction in the upper ceiling of land holding: 
 After dissolve the zamindary system, exploitation strategy was changed by the richer group.  
They start to buy huge amount of land and rent out these land in share cropping arrangement 
in taking half of the produced crop without sharing any parts of the cost. That leads the share 
cropping tenant farmers lack of incentive in cultivation of share cropped land rationally. 
As a result, restriction was needed successively to maintain the upper ceiling of the land 
holding (LRB, 1982). In this trend, Tebhaga movement was gradually becoming stronger by 
the share cropping tenant farmers in the support of rational civil society. 
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2.1.3.5 Legal provision of land reform ordinance 1984 
In this ordinance the division of the produce and duration of share cropping contract aspects 
are stated as follows: 
The produce of any share cropped land shall be divided in the following manner, namely: 
(i) One-third shall be received by the land owner for land; 
(ii) One-third shall be received by the tenant for the labor; 
(iii) One-third shall be received by the land owner or the tenant or by both in proportion to 
the cost of cultivation, other than the cost of labor, borne by them; 
About the duration aspect of the share cropping contract, it is stated that the contract shall be 
valid for a period of five years commencing from such date as may be specified in the 
contract.  
 
2.1.3.6 Specification and implication of land reform ordinance 1984 
According to this ordinance “Owner” refers in relation to share cropping arrangement the 
person from whom tenant gets the land for cultivation under a share cropping contract. 
“Tenant” refers the person who under the system generally cultivates the land of another 
person on condition of delivering a share of the produce of such land to that person. The main 
specification and distinct features of this ordinance are as follows: 
 1. No farmer acquire more than 8.016 hectare of land …under section 4 (1); Implication of 
this section is to prevent exploitation of the share croppers from rich farmers. 
 2. Every Bargader (Share cropper) shall be construed under the specific contract as notified 
by the government from the 14 April, 1984. If this procedure is not followed by the Bargader 
will be null & void and government will acquire all such product. Once a Barga (Share 
cropping) contract is made it shall be valid for next 5 years from the date it is made …under 
section 8; the implication of this section is to ensure security in share cropping arrangement. 
 3. Product grown by Barga system will divided into 3 parts: (1) one- third one will get by 
the land owner (2) one - third another will get by the Bargader (3) the rest another will get the 
person who bear the cost of cultivation other than the labor borne by them …under section 12.  
The implication of this section is to enhance net revenue (Incentive)   in the share cropping 
arrangement for the tenant. 
 4. Where the extends to sell the Barga land shall ask the Bargader in writing if he is willing 
to purchase the land from 15 days from the date of received the offer Bargader has to 
communicate in writing to the land owner whether Bargader is agree or not to 
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purchase…under section13; the implication of this section is Bargader will get preference to 
buy the land. If this is not followed by the land owner then Bargader can complain even in 
the judicial court. 
 5. One Bargader can cultivate only 2.004 hectare of land, excess of it is prohibited by law… 
under section15; the implication of this section is to ensure the intensive use of Barga land. 
 6. All disputes between Bargader and land owner shall be settled by the authority as may be 
prescribed by the government …under section 16; the implication of this section is to make 
the judgment procedure affordable for the tenant.  
 7. Accused will be penalized with Taka of two thousand if he violates this 
ordinance…under section 21; the implication of this section is to make aware the land owner 
in obeying this legal provision. 
 8. Suit can be filed in village court for compensation …under section 6; the implication of 
this section is to bring the judicial procedure closer to the tenant to make access easy for them. 
 9. This ordinance came into force on 14 April 1984 as land reform ordinance 1984…under 
section 1(1); the implication of this section is to enact the ordinance from a fixed date to 
make the ordinance effective and f fruitful. 
 
2.1.3.7 Problem associated with share cropping arrangement and land reform 
ordinance 1984 
According to Todaro and Smith (2014) giving share croppers a larger share of the produce 
and security of tenure on the land, the result can be not only higher income of the tenant but 
also greater overall efficiency. The higher product share gives higher work effort incentives, 
and greater security of tenure gives greater investment incentives. 
Initiative has been taken in this respect in introducing produce and input cost sharing 
provision (Section 12) of land reform ordinance 1984. This will lead to attain higher share of 
the produce (Net revenue) for the share cropper. Again, initiative of security has been ensured 
by determining the minimum duration of rented land (Section 8). 
Tenant farmers are poor; they have low income and low employment opportunity outside 
farming. According to Scott (1976) safety first logic works among farmers in this very low 
income, little land, large families, vulnerable yields and few outside employment 
opportunities except farming. This safety first logic is the drawback to increase the average 
return of the farmers. 
Four categories of land namely, owned land, mortgaged land, leased land and share cropped 
land are cultivated by the farming categories. Cultivators get proper rationality due to proper 
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incentive in cultivation of their land in cultivating owned land, mortgaged land as well as 
leased land, but they do not get this rationality in cultivating share cropped land. Because, 
only in the share cropped land cultivators (tenant farmers) need to provide half of the 
produced crop to the land owner according to the legal provision of land reform ordinance 
1984, but input cost is not shared accordingly, though input cost sharing is also incorporated 
in this legal provision. That leads to lack of proper incentive to the tenant farmers. Land 
reform ordinance 1984 was undertaken to ascertain this incentive for the share cropped land. 
 
2.1.3.8 Result in implication of land reform ordinance 1984 
Output sharing is conducted according to this land reform ordinance 1984 but input cost 
sharing is not practiced properly between owner and tenant farmers (Ullah, 1996). This 
depiction is also found from a conducted study in Bangladesh in 50:50 system of share 
cropping, the total produce was shared between owner and tenant farmers in 50:50 ratio. In 
that case the owner shared around 20 percent of the input cost. The rest 80 percent of the 
production cost was borne by the tenant (CIRDAP, 2009). 
2.1.3.9 Limitation of land reform ordinance 1984 
According to the provision of this ordinance accused will be penalized Taka two thousand if 
he violates this ordinance and the matter will be settled in the village court (… Under section 
21); there is no provision of imprisonment or, matter to be settled in judicial court for the 
accused. Due to this limitation owner farmers do not implement this ordinance properly.  
 
2.1.3.10 Land reform ordinance 1984 and agricultural production 
Land ownership pattern affects per hectare gross revenue by using the efficient use of inputs 
under different land tenure arrangements. In Bangladesh, about one-fifth of the total operated 
area is under some kind of tenancy arrangements with share cropping covering about one-half 
of the lands (Tenaw et al., 2009).  
There are studies (Ahmed, 2012; Asadullah, 2005) about land tenure and tenancy system in 
Bangladesh refuting the claim about the significance of land leasing in and consequence 
enhancements in the viability of small farms, it is cited evidence that the terms of tenancy in 
Bangladesh were very oppressive. In large portion of the cases, the share of land owner was 
50 per cent of the produced crops as rent without sharing any parts of the cost and at least 5 
per cent of the cases the share of rent was more than 50 per cent. 
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Thus, when full cost accounting is applied the share croppers incurred a negative return. It is 
also argued that share croppers were more dependent on family labor than owner farmers and 
they survived through self-exploitation and tremendous deprivation in the form of under 
consumption (Ullah, 1996). 
2.2 Agricultural land issues, contractual arrangements and efficiency of agricultural 
production in Bangladesh 
2.2.1 Introduction 
Access to land refers to the ability to use the land and other natural resources to control the 
resources and to transfer the rights to the land and take advantage of other opportunities in the 
rural economy. In getting this advantage different contractual arrangements are prevailed in 
using agricultural land. Bangladesh is a highly densely populated country. The total area of 
Bangladesh is 144,000 sq.km and population is 150 million (BBS, 2011). Due to this the 
distribution of farm holdings has been changed over time and different contractual 
arrangements are prevailing in agricultural production. 
2.2.2 Percentages distribution of agricultural land among households in 1977 and 1979 
in Bangladesh 
In 1977, 9.67% households enjoyed 50.68% of agricultural land, but 77.67% households was 
the owner of 25.17% of agricultural land only. The rest 12.66% households got the ownership 
of 24.15% of agricultural land in the country (LRB, 1982). In this trend, the depiction of 
distribution in land ownership was 2% households owned 25% of agricultural land, 10% 
households owned 53% of agricultural land and the rest 88% households owned only 22% of 
agricultural land in 1979. This depicts the reality of absolutely unequal distribution (Ullah, 
1996).  
2.2.3 Distribution of farm holdings and area in Bangladesh 
Table 2.2.3.1 presents the distribution of farm holdings and area in Bangladesh. From the 
table it is found that, the percentage of owner farmers was 61.66 in 1996 and this percentage 
reached in 69.76 in 2008. The percentage of owner cum tenant farmers was 34.86 in 1996 
which became 23.73 in 2008. Again the percentage of tenant farmers was 3.48 in 1996 which 
became 6.51 in 2008. In case of tenant farmers the percentage has been changed merely 
during this time period. As a result, the average farm size of all tenure categories was 0.61 ha 
in 1996 and this average farm size reduced in 0.54 ha in 2008. In this turn, per farm 
household operated area was 0.70 ha in 1996 and this operated area reduced in 0.65 ha in 
2008.  
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Table 2.2.3.1 Percentage distribution of farm holdings and area by type of tenure in 
Bangladesh 
Type 
of 
tenure 
           1996            2008 
 % of 
farm 
holdings 
 % of area Average 
farm size 
(ha) 
 % of 
farm 
holdings 
 % of 
area 
Average 
farm size 
(ha) 
Owner 61.66 58.51 0.66 69.76 73.32 0.69 
Owner 
cum 
tenant   
 
34.86 
 
39.59 
 
0.79 
 
23.73 
 
24.08 
 
0.66 
Tenant 3.48 1.90 0.39 6.51 2.60 0.26 
ALL 100.00 
(11.80 
million) 
100.00 
(8.29 
million ha) 
0.61 100.00 
(14.53 
million) 
100.00 
(9.49 
million 
ha) 
 
0.54 
Source: Tenaw et al., 2009 Note: Average farm size indicates average farm size of owner, 
owner cum tenant and tenant farmers Figures in the parentheses indicate total   
2.2.4 Distribution of farm holdings and area in Basail Upazila 
The Table 2.2.4.1 depicts the distribution of farm holdings and area by type of tenure in 
Basail Upazila. From the table it is found that the percentage of owner farmer increased, but 
the percentages of both owner cum tenant and tenant farmer decreased during this time period. 
This was because of advantage of owner farmers as well as dis-advantage of owner cum 
tenant and tenant farmers in their farming. As a result, the average farm size of all tenure 
categories was 0.48 ha in Basail upazila in 1996. This average farm size reduced to 0.43 ha in 
Basail upazila in 2008. During this time period the cultivated area in Basail upazila was 
increased. This was because of newly cultivated area came under cultivation in Basail upazila 
by covering the low lying riverine area under cultivation. The operated area per farm 
household in Basail upzila was 0.54 ha in 1996. Again the operated area per farm household 
in Basail upzila was reduced in 0.47 ha in 2008. 
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Table 2.2.4.1 Percentage distribution of farm holdings and area by type of tenure in Basail  
Upazila 
 Basail/ 1996 Basail/ 2008   
Type of 
tenure 
 
% farm 
holdings 
% of area Average 
farm size 
(ha) 
% of farm 
holdings 
% of area Average 
farm size 
(ha) 
Owner   64.70  55.87  0.46  68.38  55.67  0.38 
Owner cum 
tenant 
 29.38 
 41.79  0.77  27.84  42.59  0.71 
Tenant 5.92  2.34 0.21  3.78  1.74  0.21 
ALL 
100.00 
(19,956) 
100.00 
(10,745 ha) 
 0.48  100.00 
(23,546) 
 100.00 
(10,962 ha) 
0.43 
Source: Bangladesh Bureau of statistics, 2011 (District series) Note: Average farm size indicates average 
farm size of owner, owner cum tenant and tenant farmers Figures in the parentheses indicate total 
2.2.5 Contractual arrangements on agricultural land 
The following contractual arrangements on agricultural land are practiced in Bangladesh: 
 (i) Share cropping: A fixed share of produced output is needed to provide to the land owner 
by the tenant as rent for the cultivated land;  
 (ii) Fixed rate tenancy: A fixed amount of money is needed to pay annually as rent to the 
land owner by the tenant; 
   (iii) Mortgaging : A certain amount of money is needed to pay to the land owner as 
mortgaged money and the duration of this mortgaged land persist until this mortgaged money 
can be repaid by the mortgagor; 
According to Herbon (1994, cited by CIRDAP, 2009), the dynamics of tenancy market in 
Bangladesh is based on two principles:  
 (i) The choice of the tenant on the basis of efficiency criteria; 
 (ii) Reduction in the supply of rentable land, because self- management is both profitable 
and necessary; 
2.2.6 Necessities of share cropping arrangement 
According to Todaro and Smith (2014) Share cropping arrangement results into exchange of 
land with agricultural produce as rent. The phenomenon of risk aversion among small scale 
farmers in presence of high land holding inequality is the reason for prevalence of share 
cropping arrangement in Bangladesh.  It occurs when peasant farmer uses the land owner`s 
farm land in exchange for a share of produced output. This share may vary from less than one 
third to more than two thirds of output, which is determined by the local labor availability 
and other inputs that the land lord provides. Over several decades theories are put forward to 
explain the existence and increasing trend of share cropping around the world including 
  
15 
 
Bangladesh (Ahmed, 2012).The popularity in existence of share cropping in the many 
economies can be justified in the following way: 
Firstly, if we do not observe share cropping where theory tells us there should be none, then 
there is something difference in reality. The theory needs to be argued by a complete 
depiction of reality. Secondly, at a more ground reality level, share cropping may still exist 
for compensating aspects, if these aspects can be corrected by appropriate policy measures, 
share cropping will decrease. Thirdly, these contractual relationships may have implications 
for other kinds of agreement issues of landlord and tenant. These issues may be the provision 
of credit to the tenant, contracting parties risk preferences, the tendency to evict the tenants 
and incentives to make long run improvement in cultivation (Ray, 2008,cited by Ahmed, 
2012). 
2.2.7 Percentage distribution of area under various pattern of land use arrangements in 
Bangladesh 
Table 2.2.7.1 shows the changes in area under various pattern of land use arrangements 
during 1983 and 1997. Share cropping remains the dominant form of tenancy arrangement, 
accounting for about 12.40 percent of area in 1983 and 13.40 percent in 1997.Share cropping 
is the most common form of tenure arrangement for the poor to gain access to land.  
The proportion of share cropping has not changed much despite the fact that there has been a 
substantial increase in landlessness over time, as a result the percentage of total operated land 
under owner cultivation was 82.70% in 1983 but this percentage reduced 78.40 in 1997  
(CIRDAP, 2009).  
 
Table 2.2.7.1 The percentage of area under various patterns of land use arrangements (as 
percentage of total land operated), 1983 and 1997 in Bangladesh 
  Pattern of land use 1983 1997 
Share cropping 12.40 13.40 
Owner cultivation 82.70 78.40 
Total other (Fixed rate, Lease, Mortgage and Others) 4.9 8.2 
Source: CIRDAP, 2009  
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2.2.8 Terms of contractual arrangements: 
The landlord sets following four contractual terms in different contractual arrangements 
(Braverman & Srinivasan, 1979): 
i. Crop share; 
ii. Tenancy size; 
iii. Rate of interest to be charged; 
iv. Necessity of credit that the tenant borrows; 
In such condition, policies like tenancy reform or provision of credit to the tenant lower than 
the market rate cannot improve the tenant`s utility level. Hence, only the land re-distribution, 
intervention in several markets, or rising alternative wage levels can improve tenant welfare.  
Hence, it is recommended that the planner will have to re-distribute land to the tenant in order 
to overcome their inability to buy land. This will improve the efficiency in a decentralized 
economy. Hence, share cropping tenancy remains a second best option as long as the 
underlying constraints on information or land transfer remain in place (Braverman & 
Srinivasan, 1979). 
2.2.9 Advantages of share cropping arrangement:  
 (i) Absentee ownership: There are some people those who are not living in the rural areas 
but they have some agricultural lands. These lands of absentee ownership can be cultivated in 
this share cropping arrangement. That reduces the rural- urban migration also (Haque & 
Rahman, 1988); 
 (ii) Farmers of large farm holding: There are some farmers who have large farm holding 
and they are unable to cultivate all of their land. These lands can be cultivated in share 
cropping arrangement (Haque & Rahman, 1988); 
 (iii) Utilization of agricultural resources (e.g. human labor, draft power etc.) of the tenant 
farmers: Tenant farmers do not have land but they have some agricultural resources those can 
be used as inputs in agricultural production. These inputs can be utilized in this share 
cropping arrangement (Herbon, 1994); 
(iv) Advantage over fixed rent: In fixed rent arrangement risk is not shared but in case of 
share cropping arrangement risk is shared between land owner and tenant farmers; 
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2.2.10 Dis-advantages of share cropping arrangement:  
 (i) Less production: In share cropping arrangement, production become less due to lack of 
incentive (Shaban, 1987); 
 (ii) In share cropping arrangement, cultivators do not get right to cultivate their land 
permanently, as a result tenant farmers do not get incentive for the improvement of the land 
quality (Haque & Rahman, 1988); 
 (iii) Tenant farmers cannot cultivate the share cropped land in a rational way of cultivation 
as they need to provide half of the produced crop to the land owner (Haque & Rahman, 
1988); 
 
2.2.11 Marshallian model of inefficiency in share cropping arrangement: A comparison 
of share cropping and fixed rate contract 
Alfred Marshall (1890) formalized these efficiency implications of share cropping versus 
fixed rate contracts (Cited by Todaro and Smith,2014). Marshall assumes that there is a 
perfect labor market based on output variable in this model. Later on, this model was 
identified valid and supported by Shaban (1987) .This Marshallian model can be explained 
geometrically in the following figure 2.2.11.1. 
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      Figure 2.2.11.1 Marshallian inefficiency in comparison of rent under fixed rate and share 
cropping contracts (Source: Ahmed,S.,2012) 
                                                                                    
Share cropping and risk: 
Share cropping can be defined as a contract where the land lord supplies the land, the tenant 
supplies the labor and non- labor inputs and produced output is shared by them. In real world, 
there are similar contracts like share cropping is very common (Ahmed, 2012). Risk and risk 
aversion also play an important role in determining share cropping tenancy (Cheung, 1968, 
1969). 
The puzzle of share cropping starts when output sharing is conducted according to legal 
provision but input cost is not shared accordingly. The classical view of share cropping was 
first introduced by Adam Smith (1776) in the first volume of Wealth of Nations. Smith 
discussed the issues surrounding incentives inherent in the share cropping arrangement. Later 
on in line with Adam Smith, Alfred Marshall (1890) depicted the efficiency implications 
between share cropping and fixed rate contracts.  
In general there will be no equilibrium share that clears the market of land. The Marshallian 
model assumes that there is a perfect labor market with exogenous wage w per unit of time 
worked and no risk in crop cultivation.  
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Geometrically from the figure 2.2.11.1, land lord`s rent under fixed rate contract= area 1+2+5 
(    awf); in a rational way of cultivation, where area 5 (      bsf) is dead weight loss (allocative 
inefficiency) area. The land lord`s rent under share cropping contract= area 1 (      aws).Hence, 
the land lord loses area 2+5 (        rws +         bsf); area 2 is loss to the tenant and area 5 is a 
dead weight loss. This is due to allocative inefficiency. From the figure (2.2.11.1), it is found 
that in fixed rental arrangement allocative efficiency is obtained but in share cropping 
arrangement this allocative efficiency cannot be achieved. The result is an excess supply of 
tenants. However, the land lord would do better by offering a fixed rate contract, thus 
eliminating the deadweight loss. Mashall argued that share cropping contract should never 
been observed under the first best condition. This implies there are some other reasons for 
prevailing share cropping contract. Therefore, the wide prevalence of the share cropping has 
remained a puzzle based on the socioeconomic condition of owner and tenant farmers.  
2.2.12 Moral economy of the peasant in the perspective of share cropping arrangement 
Chayanov has shown in his classical study on Russian small holder peasant in respect of 
various aspects of moral economy (Scott, 1976). If cultivation is practiced in a way only by 
increasing the extra amount of labor in a fixed plot of land due to abundant supply of labor 
then marginal productivity of labor becomes very low, nearly zero. Then labor will not get 
their proper equity, Chayanov called this self-exploitation. If this self-exploitation remains in 
whole agricultural system, then that is called agricultural involution. Such an economic 
scenario peasant will adopt “safety first” logic in their cultivation process. Peasant in this 
safety first logic, minimize the probability of disaster risk rather maximizing average return. 
It is claimed that if peasant can overcome this safety first logic that might be helpful for them 
to increase their average return significantly. This safety first logic works in very low income, 
little land, large families, vulnerable yields and few outside employment opportunities except 
farming.  
Share cropping has existed in various times and places in various forms, due to different 
types of socioeconomic background of owner and tenant farmers. “Sometimes the tenant`s 
share is one-half, sometimes it is not. Sometimes the output share equals the cost share, 
sometimes it does not. Sometimes productivity is higher on share cropped land than on other 
types of tenancy or with self-cultivation, sometimes it is not. Sometimes share croppers are 
poor, sometimes they are prosperous. Sometimes,  share croppers produce risky cash crops, 
sometimes they produce for subsistence”(Otsuka and Murakami, 2007).  
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Marshallian tradition is based on one variable, this Marshallian tradition was built on the 
implicit assumption that the share cropping contract refers to only one variable- share of 
output. However, as pointed out by Cheung (1968) and other authors, a contract needs not to 
contain only one variable. Cheung (1968) begins his analysis by arguing that many real world 
contracts (he draws support for his argument from Taiwan) specify through a set of items 
such as the amount of land to be cultivated, non-labor inputs to be supplied, etc., in addition 
to the rental share (Cited by Todaro and Smith,2014). By incorporating these features in his 
model, Cheung is able show the pareto efficiency in share cropping contract. However, unlike 
traditional analysis, he views the problem from the landlord`s side. 
Bardhan and Srinivasan (1971) extended the conventional unilateral maximization approach 
to a general equilibrium approach using same set of transaction items as Cheung did (1968). 
They allow both the influence of landlord and tenant in determination of the share cropping 
arrangement retaining perfectly competitive labor market of Cheung and Marshall. The share 
tenant in the Bardhan-Srinivasan model has the option of leasing in land to cultivate with his 
own labor or working as wage labor in some alternative employment. 
The tenant is assumed to maximize his utility defined in terms of income and leisure. 
However, Bardhan and Srinivasan meticulously explain the utility of land issue but do not 
provide any proof of existence in equilibrium, while they claimed that the price of land is not 
zero because additional land would provide additional utility. 
Perhaps the most common answer for the existence of share cropping is existence of 
agricultural risk. The terms of tenancy contracts are built upon the magnitude of these 
predicted and unpredicted risks. The share cropping has been a device to share such risk 
between landlord and tenant. A number of scholars have attempted to provide a rigorous 
formulation of this and related problems (Stiglitz, 1974; Holmstrom, 1979; Holmstrom and 
Milgrom ,1987). 
The analysis  of share cropping under uncertainty thus provide one with the following 
rationale for the existence of the institution: firstly, as risk sharing device; secondly, as 
providing incentives to the tenant; thirdly, as economizing on information or moral hazard 
problem; fourthly, as a means of screening workers of different capabilities and finally, as a 
tool for threat of eviction. 
In 1979 Newbery and Stiglitz emphasized uncertainty in agricultural production issues and 
looked more closely at the question of prevalence of share cropping and enriched the 
environment where there are uncertainties in agricultural production. They assumed both 
output and product price may be risky. In share cropping arrangement, this risk is shared 
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between landlord and tenant; thus, the share cropping contract may be better than a fixed rate 
contract for the risk adverse tenant as well as risk adverse landlord.     
Cheung (1960) argued that profit maximizing landlords would establish contract requiring 
adequate work effort from the tenant as well as stipulate each party`s share of output. In such 
case, if one tenant failed to live up to his part of the bargain, he would be replaced by another 
tenant who will be willing to work harder. Thus share cropping would be as efficient as any 
other contractual form. 
The overall greater efficiency can be achieved through well designed and enforced land 
tenancy reform. Costly supervision of labor is also recognized as the cause to allow tenant 
and landlord to engage in share cropping (Stiglitz, 1974; Braverman & Srinivasan, 1979). 
Risk and risk aversion also play an important role in determining share tenancy (Cheung 
1968; 1969). 
Again it is also detected that the negative incentive of crop sharing and difficulty in 
monitoring effort (transaction cost) are further two reasons to go for share tenancy (Jaynes, 
1979, cited by Ahmed,S.,2012).  
Moreover, wage rate risk in labor market can also lead to the share cropping contracts to be a 
superior to mixture of wage and fixed rate contract (Newbery and Stiglitz, 1979, cited by 
Ahmed,S.,2012). 
 
2.2.13 The economics of share cropping  
The phenomenon of risk aversion among peasant farmers in the presence of high land 
inequality is basically responsible for the prevalence of share cropping arrangement. 
Although different types of relationship may arise between land owner and tenant farmers 
who engaged in share cropping contract. 
 In share cropping contract landlord`s share varies place to place time to time. In this contract, 
the landlord`s share may vary from less than a third to more than two- thirds of output, 
depending on the local labor availability and other inputs (such as credit, seeds and tools) that 
the landlord provides. Alfred Marshall observed that the tenant farmer was, in effect, paid 
only part, rather than his entire marginal product and would rationally reduce work effort 
accordingly. This effect can be seen graphically in the following figure 2.2.13.1.Labor input 
is found along the x-axis, which may be interpreted as number of hours of work or of total 
effort; value of output per unit of labor is found along the y-axis. A farmer who owned his 
owned farm land would work until his value of marginal product of labor (MVPL) was equal 
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to his alternative wage, or opportunity cost of labor wA, and so would put in an efficient 
amount of labor LF. However a share cropper receives only a fraction Ƴ, of his effort; for 
example, under 50-50 share cropping, the share cropper`s share would be Ƴ= 0.5. Thus the 
share cropper would receive only Ƴ of his value of marginal product, or, ƳVMPL.  
 As a result, the share cropper would have an incentive to put in an inefficiently low level 
effort, Ls as seen in figure 2.2.13.1. This view was challenged in the 1960s by Steven Cheung, 
who argued that profit maximizing landlord establish contracts requiring adequate work 
effort from the tenant as well as stipulating each party`s share of the output. If as Cheung 
argued, effort is not too difficult to monitor, then if one tenant failed to live up his part of the 
bargain, he would be replaced by another tenant who was willing to work harder. As a result 
share cropping would be as efficient as any other contractual form. 
Cheung`s theory is known as monitoring approach ,in contrast to the Marshallian approach to 
the analysis of share cropping illustrated in figure 2.2.13.1.Cheung argued that labor effort, 
LF, would also obtain under share cropping (Klitgaard,1991, cited by Todaro and 
Smith,2014).  
In fact, some scholars believe that land lord may offer to the tenant an option of either share 
cropping or fixed rate rental contract. 
Because higher ability farmers more often choose fixed rate contract arrangement to get the 
full value of their marginal product, while this is not as attractive to the lower ability farmers. 
If landlord is not sure about the ability of the farmers, then they may find out by observing 
which ones choose the fixed rate contract. 
The motivation may be to enable landlord to squeeze more profits, charging higher effective 
rents for fixed rate contract than share cropping contract. Again, not too high or even high 
ability farmers would choose share cropping. This approach is known as screening hypothesis 
of share cropping contract (World Bank, 1997). 
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 Figure 2.2.13.1 Marshallian incentive under owner and share cropping cultivation (Source: 
Todaro and Smith, 2014) 
                                                                                
Later on in the line of Marshall, Shaban (1987) supported Marshallian inefficiency approach 
of share cropping and identified comparing the same farmer`s behavior under different 
contractual arrangements using the farm level data from India (Cited by Todaro and Smith, 
2014). He compared average per acre value of output produced and different input used 
across owned land and share cropped land of the same household and found that farmers used 
fewer input and produced less output on share cropped land than their owned land. These 
results provide the evidence that share cropping is less efficient than farming in one`s owned 
land.  
A final approach suggests that share cropping is relatively efficient after all, in that it makes 
the best out of an inherently uncertain and risky situation for both the parties according to 
their requirements. Thus, share cropping represents a compromise between the risk to the 
landlord that the tenant will not do much work and the risk to the tenant that a fixed rate 
tenancy will in some years leave him no income. 
So, even though share cropping with its poor work incentives is needed in the real world of 
inequality in land ownership as well as uncertainty by adopting proper measures.  
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Attempts  at re- distributive reform through the establishment of upper ceiling have been a 
feature both Pakistan and Bangladesh periods, but these were not effective due to the mal- 
practice of wealthy and powerful people (CARE, 2003). 
Beside this, it is found based on the study that re- distributive land reform measure was not 
suggested because even the landless was found to purchase land using their non-farm 
incomes and loans from NGOs (Akanda and Shoichi, 2008).   
Moreover, it is found from a conducted study in Bangladesh that, in one-half tenancy system 
of share cropping- the total produce was shared between owner and tenant farmers in a 50:50 
ratio. In that case the owner shared around 20 percent of the input cost, mostly the cost of 
seed and part of the land preparation cost. The rest 80 percent of the production cost - 
irrigation, fertilizer, pesticide, harvesting was borne by the tenant.  Financially solvent tenant 
never took land under one –half tenancy system (CIRDAP, 2009).  
On the other hand, in two- thirds system of share cropping arrangement- tenant farmers got 
two-thirds of the total produce; in that case, owner farmers did not contribute in any input 
cost. 
The higher share for the tenant, result into higher investment and consequently leads to attain 
higher land productivity in this two- thirds system of share cropping. As a result it is found 
that two- thirds system of share cropping was at least 5-20% more productive than one- half 
system (CIRDAP, 2009).  
2.2.14 Farming system and efficiency in agricultural production 
The adaptation of proper variety and other socioeconomic factors have significant impact on 
technical efficiency in rice production of different farming system in Bangladesh (Barmon, 
2013). In this study it is found that farmers producing modern variety of rice were more 
technically efficient than farmers producing rice in prawn gher (Area used for prawn 
cultivation) farming in the coastal region of Bangladesh. 
The noted literatures clearly demonstrate that the stochastic frontier approach is widely used 
in agricultural economics studies. In case of Bangladesh, it is observed that fragmentation of 
land generates production inefficiency in agriculture sector (Wadud, 2003). In this study it is 
also found that farmers could increase their rice production by 9 to 39 per cent if they could 
operate at full technical efficiency level with their existing resources and technology. The 
mean technical efficiency of Nigerian agriculture is 77 percent (Idiong,  2007).  
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The mean technical efficiency of Nepalese rice seed growers is 81 percent and it is found that 
there was a wide variation in technical efficiency due to education level and experience of the 
farmers in seed production (Khanal and Maharjan, 2013). 
In case of Bangladesh, it is found that adaptation of proper variety has significant impact on 
technical efficiency ( Barmon, 2013). But it is also found based on the study (Hossain, 1991) 
that in case of share cropping arrangement if input is shared by the land owner then 
adaptation rate becomes higher in cultivation of high yielding varieties (HYV) but if this 
input cost is not shared by land owner then adaptation rate becomes lower and this adaptation 
rate becomes highest in case of fixed rental arrangement. This indicates, in share cropping 
arrangements if input cost is not shared properly by the land owner then that share cropping 
arrangement works as a drawback of adaptation of HYV as well as enhancement of technical 
efficiency. 
Moreover, Todaro and Smith (2014) emphasized that security in land tenure is needed to be 
ensured based on the duration, protection and robustness characteristics of security in land 
tenure aspect for attaining better outcome. In addition, these incentives and security aspects 
are also emphasized by Scott (1976) arguing that balance of peasant and elite is needed in 
consideration of moral and welfare aspects of peasant. This balance should be based on 
subsistence and security. Cultivators prefer to minimize the probability of disasters rather 
than maximizing average return in safety first logic. Again vulnerability among peasant starts 
in the subsistence agriculture from the early childhood of the peasant. That leads to self-
exploitation in the long run. Incentive on subsistence and security based preventive measures 
are needed as protective means of this self-exploitation. Additionally, in share cropping 
arrangement it is emphasized that giving share croppers a larger share of the produce and 
security of tenure on the land is needed for the better outcome. This better result can be not 
only higher income of the tenant but also greater overall efficiency. The higher product share 
gives higher work effort incentives, and greater security of tenure gives greater investment 
incentives (Todaro and Smith, 2014). These issues of share cropping arrangement as well as 
other aspects of agricultural production have been addressed properly in Land reform 
ordinance 1984 (Unnayan Onneshan, 2009).    
  
  
26 
 
Chapter3. Analytical flow and Methodology 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
            
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
               
          
  
  
  Land reform ordinance 1984  
 The produce of any share cropped 
land shall be divided in the 
following manner, namely into 3 
parts: 
•  One-third shall be received by the 
land owner for land; 
•  One-third shall be received by the 
tenant for the labor; 
•  One-third shall be received by the 
land owner or the tenant, or by both 
in proportion to the cost of 
cultivation, other than the cost of 
labor, borne by them; 
  Duration aspect of the share 
cropping contract, it is stated that 
the contract shall be valid for a 
period of five years.  
 Change in access to agricultural 
holding: 
•Upper ceiling of holding 8.016 ha; 
•Upper ceiling of rented land 2.004 ha; 
 
• Incentive 
(50:50 input cost 
sharing for all the 
input except labor 
for work effort 
incentive) 
•Security 
(Tenancy right at 
least for 5 years for 
investment 
incentive) 
•Prevent 
exploitation 
          •Remove the 
drawback of 
enhancement in 
agricultural 
productivity 
 
 # Agricultural 
Production and 
Land Tenure  
#Technical 
efficiency 
 
Figure 3.1 Analytical flow of the study 
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3.1 Interaction of the components within the framework 
Focal issue of land reform ordinance 1984 is to maintain the equity aspect of share cropping 
arrangement. This ordinance was declared to maintain this equity issue for the improvement 
of agricultural production including agricultural production in share cropped land. 
Maintaining the ceiling of upper holding limit was needed to prevent exploitation of the 
richer farmers to the poorer tenant farmers as share cropping arrangement cannot be practiced 
as profit oriented commercial business. This celling for the upper limit of land holding was 
introduced by this land reform ordinance 1984. A study on agricultural production in the 
different land tenure arrangements has been incorporated in chapter 5 based on benefit cost 
ratio (BCR) and analysis of variance (ANOVA). Technical efficiency in stochastic frontier 
model has been arranged in chapter 6 to detect the technical efficiency of owner, owner cum 
tenant and tenant farmers. This technical efficiency in the different land tenure arrangements 
has been incorporated to enrich the research arena of agricultural production according to 
land tenure arrangements of Basail Upazila in Bangladesh. 
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Figure 3.2 Map of study area in Bangladesh 
Source: (Alauddin & Sharma, 2013) 
 
3.2 Study Area: 
The geographical location of Bangladesh is 20034, and 26038, north latitude and between 
88001, and 92041, east longitude. The north and west side of this country is surrounded India, 
east side is surrounded by India and Myanmar and south side is surrounded by Bay of Bengal. 
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There are 64 districts and 509 Upazilas in the country. This study was carried out at Basail 
upazila of Tangail district in Bangladesh. The area of Basail upazila is 158 sq. km and 
population is 176,002.  
This study area was selected as this Upazila has some location advantages in farming those 
can represent the agricultural production according to land tenure arrangements in the 
different categories of farming. 
3.3 Sources of data 
Primary sources of data 
Data were collected from January, 2013 to March, 2013 by household survey questionnaire 
method according to the design of the study. 
Secondary sources of data 
Secondary sources of data are based on literature review on concerned related issues right 
from the conception is the sources of secondary data. This secondary data were used to 
enlarge arena of this research. 
3.4 Sampling design 
This study was conducted based on 150 respondents equally 50 for each category by stratified 
random sampling technique to trace out the agricultural production in the different land 
tenure arrangements based on the cultivated crops in a cropping year.  
3.5 Data analysis 
This study is based on quantitative data collected from field survey, government publication 
and data bases. These quantitative analyses were supplemented by information generated 
through group discussions and meeting with the government officials, public representative 
and civil society in the study area. The results of the collected data were analyzed in relation 
to the policy and programs undertaken by the government over the periods. For this 
quantitative analysis, data were collected through field surveys according to the requirement 
and compiled from government documents were coded and entered into computer for proper 
processing of the data. Data entry and analysis were conducted using computer packages such 
as Microsoft excels spread sheets and analytical software STATA 13 according to the 
requirement of analyzes those data. To find out the general overview of data the initial was 
done based on simple descriptive analysis, frequencies, percentage and cross tabulations. The 
other statistical tools used for analysis were analysis of variance, ordinary least square 
regression, Tobit regression analysis including stochastic production frontier model. All of 
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these statistical econometric tools were used with theoretical understanding in relation to 
agricultural production and land tenure arrangements discussed in more detail in the relevant 
chapters. Gross revenue was calculated produced quantity of crops multiplying by per unit 
obtained price of the farmers from that concerned crops. In calculating total cost of the 
farmers all the labor and non- labor cost were taken into account. Benefit ratio (BCR) was 
used to get the benefit cost ratio based on gross revenue and total cost of cultivated different 
types of crops in crop wise as well as land category wise in the cultivated various categories 
of land of the farmers. Net revenue was calculated gross revenue subtracting the total 
production cost. This net revenue provides the net margin of the farmers.   Again analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) was used to get the mean difference of net revenue of the different 
categories of land of the farmers. This ANOVA was needed to be assessed based on net 
revenue, because tenant farmers need to provide half of the produced crop to land owner as 
rental cost of land. Measuring technical efficiency is one of the approaches for understanding 
how farmers could maximize the benefits from the proper utilization of existing resources 
and technologies. This approach can be conducted using production, cost or profit function. 
This production based approach is called technical efficiency (Battese and Coelli, 1995). This 
technical efficiency measurement was needed to detect the existing technical efficiency of the 
different categories of farmers as well as to identify the potentiality for enhancing this 
technical efficiency. Thus, technical efficiency has been measured to identify this existing 
efficiency level as well as to detect the maximum attainable technical efficiency level of the 
farmers in utilizing their existing resources and technologies in crop cultivation in the 
different categories of cultivated land. 
3.6 Linking stochastic frontier model and technical efficiency in agricultural 
production: 
Empirical model for production 
 lnYi= a+ b1lnX1 + b2 lnX2 + b3 lnX3 + b4 ln X4 + b5 ln X5  + b6 ln X6  +  𝜇i … (1) 
Where, 
Y = Gross revenue of output (Taka ha-1) of different types of cultivated land in 
different types of farming 
 a, b1, b2, b3, b4 , b5, b6= Parameters to be estimated  
X1= Human labor cost (Taka ha-
1) in different types of cultivated land 
X2= Power tiller cost (Taka ha-
1) in different types of cultivated land 
X3= Seed cost (Taka ha-
1) in different types of cultivated land 
 
X4=Material cost (Taka ha-
1) in different types of cultivated land 
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X5=Irrigation cost (Taka ha-
1) in different types of cultivated land 
X6= Land use cost (Taka ha-
1) in different types of cultivated land 
 
  𝜇i
 = Error term 
 
3.7 Empirical model for TE 
The TE of the farmers in the context of stochastic frontier model can be expressed as: 
TEi =
𝑌𝑖
𝑌𝑖∗
= 𝑓(𝑥𝑖; 𝛽)exp⁡(𝑣𝑖 − 𝑢𝑖)/𝑓(𝑥𝑖; 𝛽)𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑣𝑖) = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝑢𝑖) …    (2) 
Where, ⁡𝑌𝑖 ∗  is the maximum possible gross revenue of output ha-1 in different types of 
cultivated land,Yi is the gross revenue of output ha-1 in different types of cultivated land, β is 
the vector of parameters to be estimated, xi presents inputs and vi, ui are error term. TEi 
measures the gross revenue of output ha-1 in different types of cultivated land of the farmers 
relative to the maximum possible gross revenue of output ha-1 in the different types of 
cultivated land that can be produced using the same cost of input vectors. This value of TEi is 
0 to 1. 
If TEi=1, Yi achieves the maximum value of 𝑓(𝑥𝑖; 𝛽)𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑣𝑖).  If TEi is less than 1, that 
indicates the shortfall of gross revenue of output from the maximum possible level. This 
situation is characterized by stochastic elements, which vary among the farmers. 
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Chapter 4. Description of Basail Upazila 
4.1 Socio-economic background 
4.1.1Introduction 
This depiction presents a brief description of the study area to know the salient features of the 
study area. Knowledge of the study area is quite essential to understand the location, physical 
features, topography, soil, climate, temperature, rainfall, agriculture, communication and 
marketing facilities. These affect their production pattern and technology use. These aspects 
are also important as these have impact on their level of living standard, socioeconomic 
environment in which they live and the nature of the extent of their participation in the 
national development programs. An effort has therefore, been made to focus briefly on some 
of the socioeconomic aspects of the study area. 
4.1.2Physical features 
Basail Upazila of Tangail district was selected as the study area for this study. This area is a 
new flood plain of Langulia river with flat topography and high density of population. North 
and south sides are surrounded by Kalihati and Mirzapur Upazila, Sakhipur and Tangail sadar 
are surrounded in the eastern and western side of the Upazila.  This study area is located 14 
K.m north- east from district head quarter and connected by Basail- Tangail high way. 
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Figure 4.1.1: Map of study area in Bangladesh showing the location of agricultural research 
institutes 
Source: Alauddin & Sharma, 2013 
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Figure 4.1.2: Map of Basail Upazila 
Source: https://www.google.co.jp 
Note: IPM indicates integrated pest management (IPM) club 
KSS indicates Krishak samaby samity (Farmers co-operative association) 
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4.1.3 Soil and Topography 
The study area is dominated by medium and high land and dominant soil type is sandy loam. 
One part of the land is high and other part of the land is medium high. Sometimes the 
medium part of the area gets affected by over flow of the river. The favorable water table, flat 
topography and loamy soil have encouraged rapid expansion of ground water irrigation 
technology such as shallow tube wells (STW) on a somewhat competitive basis and achieved 
irrigated acreage and yield well above the national averages. So, the irrigation potentiality of 
this area is very good.   
4.1.4 Climate, temperature and rainfall 
There is no meteorological center in the study area. As a result exact climatic data are not 
available. The neighboring meteorological center is located at Tangail town which is about 14 
Km from the study area. It is however believed that the climatic condition of the study area 
does not differ much than that of Tangail town. The temperature of the study area varies from 
10-360c. Cold weather persists from November to February and hot weather prevails during 
March to September with average temperatures of 17.500c and 32.800c respectively. The 
highest temperature is in April (34.710c). The coldest month is in January when average 
temperature becomes 11.600c.Heavy rainfall occurs in the area from the end of April and cold 
continues even up to month of December. The average rainfall is about 1,530 mm with the 
lowest in the month of January and highest in the month of July. 
4.1.5 Area and population 
The total area of the Upazila is 158 sq. Km and population is176,002. That depicts the 
population density 481/sq.Km  
 
   4.1.6 Roads, communication and marketing facilities 
The communication system in the study area is good. There is a Basail- Tangail high way 
linked by kuccha (earthen) roads which allows transportation by rickshaw and vans mainly. 
The internal communication among the villages is also good. Therefore, the marketing 
facilities in the study area are reasonably developed. 
 The local markets are located within a short distance. Basail hat (Big market arranged in a 
specific day of the week) and Korotia hat are two well accommodated hat for buying and 
selling commodities according to the requirement of the people. 
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4.1.7 Agriculture 
Majority of the households in the study area are dependent on agriculture directly or 
indirectly for their livelihood. Due to the expansion of irrigation facilities, the agricultural 
practices are relatively intensive in this area. A brief description of crops, labor use, modern 
technology and agricultural wages of the study area are given below: 
4.1.7.1 Crops and cropping seasons: 
The major cultivated crops in the study area are high yielding variety (HYV) Boro and T. 
Aman. B. Aman, mustard, jute, wheat and pulses are cultivated as minor crops in the study 
area. Normally two or three crops are cultivated in each plot of land among these crops in a 
year based on the flood situation and other favorable condition of the farmers. However HYV 
Boro is the most important crop in the study area and this HYV Boro is cultivated to meet up 
the demand of staple food rice. There are 4 cropping seasons, like Rabi I, Rabi II, Kharif I 
and Kharif II.  Mustard and wheat are cultivated in Rabi I and HYV Boro is cultivated in 
Rabi II. B. Aman and jute are cultivated in Kharif I and T. Aman is grown in Kharif II. 
 Mustard is grown between first October to January last and wheat is grown between 
November to March. HYV Boro is grown between January to mid- May. B. Aman is grown 
between mid-February to November but T. Aman is grown September to December. 
4.1.7.2 Use of modern technology 
Modern technology namely STW irrigation, modern varieties of seeds, chemical fertilizers 
and insecticides are widely used in the study area. 
 STW are mainly used for watering HYV Boro in the study area. Major cropping patters are 
dominated by HYV of Boro and local variety (LV) of T. Aman paddy. 
4.1.7.3 Labor use and wage rate 
Different crops require different amount of labor and growing season varies from crop to crop. 
The cropping pattern which is relatively high labor intensive requires the excess demand for 
labor for that certain period. In the study area, the excess demand for labor is created in the 
month of January, when the land preparation and transplanting of HYV Boro is started. Use 
of labor is also increased in the month of May- the harvesting period of this HYV Boro.  
Wage rate of agricultural labors vary place to place and period to period. Within each village, 
the effective wage rate of male labor, particularly for land preparation, transplanting, weeding, 
harvesting and threshing activities is higher than the female. 
Wage is mainly paid in cash in the study area; payment of wage for all operation is done 
extensively at time rate 8 hours/ day. Female labors are observed to have lower wage rate 
than male labors for any agricultural activities. These female labors are mainly used in post 
harvesting activities of crops. The payment of these female labors is very often paid in kind. 
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4.1.7.4 Animal  
The farmers in the study area raise cattle, goat, sheep, chicken and duck. Monitoring of 
information indicated that chicken and duck population gradually increased per household in 
the study area due to implementation of the government project namely “One household one 
farm” support, invention of improved breeds and proper vaccination program (DAE, 
2013).This support is not merely extended to other animals like cattle, goat etc. 
4.1.7.5 Fishery 
Most of the homestead has one or more ponds where culture of fishes like Roie, Katla, Mrigel, 
Silver carp, Mirror carp, Thai sarpoti are cultivated. High yielding breeds of these fishes are 
cultivated in paddy cum fish farming. 
4.1.8 Institution 
There is one college, one government boys’ high school, one girl s’ high school, seven 
government primary school and one madrasa (Religious school) in the study area. Boys and 
girls in the study area can get their education there. 
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4.2 Agriculture in Basail Upazila 
4.2.1Introduction: 
Basail Upazila is located 14 K. m far away from Tangail district.  The total area covered by 
this Upazila is 158 sq. Km having total number of population is 176,002. 80% of its 
population directly or indirectly depends on agriculture. Total cultivable land in the Upazila 
is 13,124 ha. Cropping intensity is 193%. Total number of union in the Upazila is 6 and 
number of pourashava 1. Total number of block in the Upazila is 18. There are 35 Agro- 
ecological zone (AEZ) in the country. This Upazila is located under AEZ 8 and 9. The 
remarkable rivers in the Upazila are namely Louhajang, Bongsai and Langulia. Rice is the 
main cereal crop in the area. Besides this mustard, wheat, jute and pulses are cultivated by the 
farmers also. The agricultural production of the farmers in the area is in increasing trend in 
utilizing modern technology in their production process. The ongoing activities conducted by 
the agricultural extension workers on organic fertilizer, green manure, compost, integrated 
Pest Management (IPM), integrated Crop Management (ICM), disease management and 
compost management are helpful and fruitful initiatives for the farmers. 
4.2.2 Socio-economic condition: 
Agriculture is the basic means to get the livelihood of the people of Basail Upazila. Once the 
local variety ( LV) Aman, mustard and jute were the dominating crops and majority of the 
lands were used as single cropped area. But, now a day’s HYV Boro, T. Aman, B. Aman, 
wheat, pulses and vegetables are cultivated merely. Majority of the lands are used as double 
or, triple cropped land by introducing modern technology. By adopting this modern 
technology the cropping intensity has been increased. Presently, this attained cropping 
intensity of this Upzila is 193%. Due to this, poverty level has been reduced and literacy rate 
has been increased. As a result present literacy rate is 52% in the Upazila. 
4.2.3 Agricultural and demographic scenario 
Total cultivable land:13,124 ha 
Number of male population: 89,000 
Number of female population:87,002 
(Source: DAE, 2013) 
Weather: Not so hot or, nor so cold. The highest temperature is 37.100 c. The lowest 
temperature is 10.200c. The average rainfall is 1,530 mm. 
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AEZ: 8,9 
The total area covered in AEZ 8: 7,200 ha 
The total area covered in AEZ 9: 5,924 ha 
Main crops: The major cultivated varieties in the study area are HYV Boro, T. Aman and B. 
Aman in paddy cultivation as major crop. Mustard, jute, wheat or pulses are cultivated as 
minor crops. Besides these, potatoes and some other vegetables are cultivated in the Upazila. 
Spices namely chili, ginger and onion are cultivated at home-stead gardening.  
Net cropped area: 13,124 ha 
Single cropped area: 3,525 ha 
Double cropped area:  7,041 ha 
Triple cropped area: 2,558 ha 
Total cropped area: 25,281 ha 
High land: 202 ha 
Medium high land: 3,552 ha 
Medium low land: 2,541 ha 
Low land:  5,657 ha 
Very low land   : 1,374 ha    
4.2.3.1 Farmers category and landlessness of the farmers 
Table 4.2.3.1.1 presents category-wise number of the farmers in Basail Upazila. The highest 
number of the farmers is in small farmer’s category and the lowest number of farmers is in 
large farmers’ category. It is found based on the study that the percentage of landless 
household was 46.00% in Bangladesh in 1988 but increased to 49.60% in 1995 (Rahman and 
Manprasert, 2006). Again this percentage of landless farmers in Basail Upazila is 24.34% and 
these landless farmers are merely dependent on share cropping as a tenant for getting their 
livelihood. 
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Table 4.2.3.1.1 Category- wise number of the farmers 
Farmers category Number 
Large farmers 1,034 
Medium farmers 4,501 
Small farmers 7,528 
Marginal farmers 7,488 
Landless farmers 6,612 
Total farmers 27,163 
(Source: DAE, 2013) 
4.2.3.2 Cultivated area according to major cropping pattern 
Table 4.2.3.2.1 presents percentage- wise cultivated area under major cropping pattern. The 
highest cultivated area is covered by HYV Boro- B. Aman- fallow cropping pattern. This is 
due to higher yield of HYV Boro and better advantage in cultivating flood tolerant variety B. 
Aman. The lowest cultivated area is under cultivation of Wheat- Jute- T. Aman cropping 
pattern. The reason for this lowest cultivated area under this cropping pattern is due to lower 
yield of wheat, jute and T. Aman compare to the yield of other cultivated crops in the area.  
 
Table 4.2.3.2.1 Cultivated area according to major cropping pattern  
Serial 
No. 
Cropping pattern Cultivated 
area (ha) 
Percentage 
Rabi Kharif I Kharif II 
1. HYV Boro Fallow T. Aman 486 3.70 
2.  HYV Boro Fallow Fallow 250 1.90 
3. HYV Boro B. Aman Fallow 5,000 38.09 
4. Mustard HYV Boro B. Aman 4,300 32.76 
5. Mustard HYV Boro T. Aman 200 1.52 
6. Wheat Jute T. Aman 64 0.48 
(Source: DAE, 2013) 
Reasons for keeping the land fallow in Kharif I: 
(i) In HYV Boro- Fallow- T. Aman cropping pattern, 50-55 days land remain fallow 
due to lack of suitable cultivable crop on that time; 
(ii) In HYV Boro -Fallow  cropping pattern, no more crop cultivation is possible in  
Kharif I due to comparatively low land and stagnant rain water; 
Reason for keeping the land fallow in Kharif II: 
(i) In HYV Boro – Fallow cropping pattern, no more new crop cultivation is 
possible due to stagnant water after harvesting of HYV Boro; 
 
 
 
 
  
41 
 
4.2.3.3 Cultivated crop area and variety-wise production in the 2011- 2012 
Table 4.2.3.3.1 presents cultivated crop area and variety-wise production in the 
Upazila. The highest cultivated area as well as production is covered by HYV 
Boro and the lowest cultivated area as well as production is covered by LV paddy. 
Table  4.2.3. 3.1 Cultivated crop area and variety- wise production in the year 2011- 2012 
Crop Main variety Cultivated 
area (ha) 
Yield/ha 
(Ton) 
Total 
production 
(Ton) 
HYV Boro BR-28,BR- 29, 
BR-45 
10,793 3.72 40,150 
LV paddy Aloy, Patjag, 
Kalijira, 
Bashiraj 
100 1.50 150 
Jute Tosha 327 7.50  2452.50  
Jute Deshi 146 6.4  934.40  
B. Aman Chamara, 
Digha, Lal  
7,200 0.85 6,120 
(Source: DAE, 2013) 
 
4.2.3.4 Cultivated area, yield and production of high yielding variety (HYV)/ cross 
variety (CV) and local variety (LV) in the year 2011-2012 
Table 4.2.3.4.1 presents variety-wise cultivated area, yield and production in the year 2011- 
2012. From the table it is found that the highest cultivated area as well as production is 
covered by cross variety and lowest cultivated area as well as production is covered by local 
variety in cultivation of Boro. In cultivation of T. Aman, both cultivated covered area as well 
as production is higher in cross variety than local variety. In case of Aus, only cross variety is 
cultivated, but for B. Aman only local variety is cultivated. Again, in wheat cultivation, cross 
variety is cultivated only with and without irrigation system and both area as well as 
production covered by without irrigation is higher than with irrigation system.  
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Table  4.2.3. 4.1 Cultivated area, yield and production of HYV/ 
CV/LV (Variety- wise) in the year 2011- 2012 
Crops Variety Cultivated 
area (ha) 
Yield/ha 
(Ton) 
Total 
production 
(Ton) 
Boro HYV 600 4.50 2700.00 
CV 10,793 3.65 39,394.45 
LV 23 1.50 34.5 
 Total 10,822 - 39,445.95 
T. Aman CV 620 2.20 1,364.00 
LV 100 1.05 150.00 
Total 720 - 1,514.00 
Aus CV 5 2.00 10.00 
LV - - - 
Total 5 - 10.00 
B. Aman  LV 7,200 0.85 6,120.00 
Wheat CV (With 
irrigation)   
12 2.50 30.00 
CV(Without 
irrigation) 
52 1.95 101.40 
Total 64 - 131.95 
(Source: DAE, 2013) 
4.2.3.5 Cultivated area, yield and production of other crops in the year 2011- 2012 
Table 4.2.3.5.1 presents area, yield and production of other crops in the 
year 2011-2012. From the table it is found that local variety of mustard, 
pulses (Kheshari), sweet potatoes and chili are cultivated but cross variety 
of potatoes and pulses (Masur) are cultivated by the farmers. 
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Table  4.2.3. 5.1 Cultivated area, yield and production of other crops in the year 2011- 2012 
Crops Main variety Cultivated area 
(ha) 
Yield/ ha 
(Ton) 
Total 
production 
(Ton) 
Mustard Cross variety 
BARI-9, 
BARI-
14,BARI-15 
52 1.00 52.00 
Local variety 
Tori- 7 
5,093 0.80 4,074.40 
Total 5,145 - 4,126.40 
Pulse 
(Kheshari) 
Local variety 38 1.10 41.80 
Til Local variety 6 0.80 4.80 
Potato Cross variety 
Dimond, 
Cardinal, Multa 
58 15.00 870.00 
Local variety 
Lal pakri 
48 8.00 384.00 
Total 106 - 1,254.00 
Sweet potato Local variety 24 18.00 432.00 
Pulse(Masur) BARI- 3 30 0.75 22.50 
Chili Local variety 7 1.20 8.40 
(Source: DAE, 2013) 
4.2.3.6 Variety- wise statistics of cereal crop 
Tables (4.2.3.6.1, 4.2.3.6.2) present variety-wise statistics of cereal crops. From the tables it is found that 
Cross variety is the dominating variety for all the cereal crops except B. Aman. This B. Aman is cultivated 
in local variety only. 
Table  4.2.3. 6.1 Variety- wise statistics of major cereal crop 
Year Boro (ha) T. Aman (ha) 
Cross 
Variety  
Local 
Variety  
Total Cross 
Variety  
Local 
Variety  
Total 
2008-2009 10,132 16 10,148 475 63 538 
2009-2010 10,625 18 10,643 502 72 574 
2010-2011 10,687 21 10,708 523 80 603 
2011-2012 10,799 23 10,822 620 100 720 
(Source: DAE, 2013) 
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Table  4.2.3. 6.2 Variety- wise statistics of minor cereal crop 
Year Local Variety rice (Aus) (ha) B. 
Aman 
(ha) 
Cross 
Variety  
Local 
variety  
Total 
2008-2009 1 - 1 4,988 
2009-2010 2 - 2 5,102 
2010-2011 3 - 3 5,895 
2011-2012 5 - 5 7,200 
(Source: DAE, 2013) 
4.2.3.7 Cultivated area, yield and production of fruits, vegetables and 
spices 
Table 4.2.3.7.1 presents area, yield and production of fruits, vegetables and 
spices. From the table it is found that local and cross variety are cultivated 
in cultivation of these fruits, vegetables and spices.   
Table  4.2.3. 7.1 Cultivated area, yield and production of fruits, vegetables and spices 
Name  Variety Cultivated 
area ( ha) 
Yield/ha 
(Ton) 
Total 
production 
(Ton) 
Fruits: 
Mango, 
Jackfruit, 
Litchi, Guava, 
Banana, Papaya 
etc. 
Local and 
cross 
variety 
   
1,005 8.00 8040.00 
Vegetables: 
Radish, Cauli 
flower, 
Cabbage, Bean, 
Sweet guard, 
Carrot, Bringel 
Local and 
cross 
variety 
263 15.00 3,945.00 
(Source: DAE, 2013) 
 
4.2.3.8  Other  agricultural statistics 
Tables (4.2.3. 8.1, 4.2.3. 8.2, 4.2.3. 8.3, 4.2.3. 8.4, 4.2.3. 8.5) present other agricultural 
statistics in Basail Upazila. Those depict the various aspects of agricultural production. 
Table 4.2.3. 8.1 Net cropped area according to cropping season 
Cropping season Net cropped area (ha) 
Rabi 13,124 
Kharif I 13,122 
Kharif II 8,170 
(Source: DAE, 2013) 
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Table  4.2.3. 8.2 Production scenario of food production 
Year Total production (Ton) 
2008- 2009 44,985 
2009- 2010 46,430 
2010- 2011 47,231 
(Source: DAE, 2013) 
Table 4.2.3.8.3 Demand of chemical fertilizer and and its uses 
Name of 
chemical 
fertilizer 
2010-2011 2011-2012 
Demand 
(Ton) 
Allotment 
(Ton) 
Demand 
(Ton) 
Allotment 
(Ton) 
Urea 5,280 5,280 5,485 5,415 
TSP 502 502 546 523 
MOP 850 850 900 875 
DAP 680 680 705 670 
SSP - - - - 
NPKS 203 203 245 294 
Zypsum 150 150 197 197 
Zinc 90 90 100 100 
(Source: DAE, 2013) Note; number of dealer 10 
 
Table 4.2.3.8.4 Uses of insecticides (2011-2012) 
Crop Cultivated 
area (ha) 
Used insecticides 
Liquid 
(Liter) 
Solid (Kg) 
HYV Boro 10,822 2,000 6,000 
Aus 5 3 - 
B. Aman 7,200 - - 
T. Aman 720 500 2,000 
Wheat 64 1  
Mustard 5,145 100 - 
Jute 473 20 - 
Vegetables 189 5 - 
Tree 
plantation 
1,005 100 - 
Total 25,623 2,729 8,000 
(Source: DAE, 2013) 
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Table 4.2.3.8.5 Food production situation in the year 2011-2012 
Total 
production 
Total demand Surplus 
47, 231 Ton 28,587 Ton 18,644 Ton 
(Source: DAE, 2013) 
4.2.3.9 Remarkable successful activities 
Table 4.2.3.9.1 presents noticeable good initiatives in farming. Those are helpful for 
sustainable farming in long run. 
Table 4.2.3.9.1 Good quality seed production in farmer’s level and use of Guti (Modified) 
urea 
 Good quality seed production Guti (Modified)urea 
Year Boro (Ton) T. Aman (Ton) Boro (ha) T. Aman (ha) 
2009- 2010 22 9 490 150 
2010-2011 25 7 550 170 
2011-2012 30 10 600 200 
(Source: DAE, 2013)  
4.2.3.10 Problems in attaining proper agricultural development 
There are some problems prevailing in the Basail Upazila. These problems are needed to be 
solved for the betterment of agricultural development in Basail Upazila. These problems are 
as follows: 
 Poverty of the farmers; 
 Lack of adequate training facilities; 
 Lack of trained farmers; 
 Scarcity of good quality seed; 
 Lack of more mechanization; 
 Reluctance of the farmers in accepting new technology; 
 Reluctance in cultivating vegetables; 
 Lack of adequate irrigation facilities; 
 Attack of pest and diseases in the cultivated crops; 
 Tendency of the farmers in using more urea; 
 Tendency of the farmers in using less manure due to lack of proper knowledge about 
soil nutrient; 
 Ignorance in preparing and storing of compost fertilizer; 
 Lack of knowledge in cultivating summer vegetables; 
 Lack of knowledge in mixed fruit gardening;    
(Source: DAE, 2013) 
 
  
47 
 
4.2.3.11 Potentialities for the improvement of agriculture 
There are some potentialities for the improvement of agriculture in Basail Upazila. These 
potentialities are as follows: 
» It is possible to improve agricultural production by providing training of the farmers in 
integrated crop management (Proper variety, soil nutrient, water management etc.) in the 
cultivation process of the farmers; 
» Fruits and vegetables production can be increased by home stead gardening of fruits and 
vegetables; 
» Mixed cropping can be cultivated for better agricultural production as well as best use of 
agricultural land; 
» In over all, it is assumed that agricultural production can be increased in a large scale in 
ensuring proper and timely supply of HYV seed, irrigation, chemical fertilizer and other 
required inputs for the farmers ; 
(Source: DAE, 2013) 
 
4.2.3.12 On-going project 
There are some on-going projects for the betterment of farming in Basail Upazila. These 
projects including their objectives are mentioned below: 
 
1. Reducing the yield gap project 
The objectives of this yield gap reducing project are as follows: 
(i)To motivate the farmers in using balance doze of fertilizer; 
(ii)To inspire the farmers in time plantation of seedling; 
(iii)To encourage the farmers to transplant seedling of appropriate age; 
(iv)To encourage the farmers in using good quality seed; 
 
2. Storage of paddy wheat seed in the farmer’s level project 
The main objective of this project is to ensure the proper seed of paddy and wheat among the 
farmers. To attain this goal the specific objectives are: 
(i)To encourage the farmers in seed production and storage this produced seed properly; 
  
48 
 
(ii)To motivate the farmers in using good quality seed; 
(ii)To reduce the poverty level of the farmers by the obtained earnings from this processing 
and marketing activities; 
3. Storage of pulses, oil seed and onion seed in the farmer’s level project 
The main objective of this project is to encourage farmers in storing the seed of pulses, oil 
seed and onion properly. To attain this goal the specific objectives are: 
(i) To reduce the deficit of the seed of pulses, oil seed and onion in their cultivation process; 
(ii)To motivate the farmers in the extension activities; 
(iii)To increase the number of seed producer in the farmers level; 
 
4. Integrated pest management (IPM) project 
The main objective of this project is to increase the production level under the eco-friendly 
farming. To attain this goal, the specific objectives are: 
(i)To attain self-sufficiency in agricultural production without damaging public health and 
environment; 
(ii)To help the small farmers in increasing their earning; 
(iii)To establish IPM club to motivate the farmers in IPM activities; 
(iv)To encourage the farmers in eco-friendly trend in farming; 
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Chapter5. Agricultural Production in the Different Land Tenure Arrangements in 
Basail Upazila 
5.1 Introduction 
The word tenancy is part and parcel related with various sorts of tenure arrangements in land 
use. Land tenure refers to the arrangements of rules, institution and process through which 
people gain legitimate access to land in this land use arrangements. They use land and 
participate in the benefits deriving from it and they hold, manage and transect it. These 
arrangements involve diverse set of land rights-from outright ownership to a range of other 
land holding use rights (lease hold, servitudes, grazing right etc.). Land tenure arrangements 
are administered by land tenure policies. Bangladesh is an agricultural developing country. 
The total area of Bangladesh is 144,000 sq. km and population is 150 million, having 
cultivable area 0f 8.44 million hectare. The contribution of agriculture sector in the share of 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is 23.50% and this sector ensures 52% of total employment 
of the country (BBS, 2011). The following three farming categories are prevailing in the 
country: 
 (I) Owner farming    (II) Owner cum tenant farming   (III) Tenant farming. 
 Among these farming categories the following tenancy arrangements are observed: 
(a) Share cropping (b) leasing   (c) Mortgaging  
Seven patterns of land are cultivated among these farming categories. Owner farmers 
cultivate owned land and mortgaged land in owner farming. In cultivating this owned land 
owner farmers get the whole amount of the produced crop as net revenue after subtracting the 
production cost. In case of mortgaged land, cultivators need not to pay any share of the 
produced output to the land owner but need to pay a certain amount of mortgaged money and 
duration of this mortgaged land persist until the mortgaged money can be repaid by the 
mortgagor (who mortgaged out the land).  Owner cum tenant farmers cultivate owned land, 
mortgaged land, leased land and share cropped land. 
In cultivation of this leased land, a certain amount of money is needed to pay annually to the 
land owner by the lessee (who leased in the land in lease system). The terms and condition of 
mortgaged land in owner cum tenant farming is same as mortgaged land in owner farming.  
Again tenant farmers cultivate share cropped land only in their renting in system in tenant 
farming by providing half of the produced crop to the land owner according to the legal 
provision of land reform ordinance 1984. This crop sharing arrangement is applied in case of 
owner cum tenant farmers share cropped land also.  
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In Bangladesh the percentages of owner, owner cum tenant and tenant farmers are 65%, 22% 
and 13% respectively (BBS, 2011). These percentages of owner, owner cum tenant and 
tenant farmers in the study area are 48%, 28% and 24% respectively (DAE, 2013). These 
percentages of both owner as well as owner cum tenant farmers were higher than these 
percentages both in Bangladesh as well as in the study area, but this percentage of tenant 
farmers was lower than this percentage of both in Bangladesh as well as in the study area in 
1996. Again, the percentage of owner farmers was higher than this percentage but the 
percentages of both owner cum tenant and tenant farmers were lower than these percentages  
in both in Bangladesh as well as in the study area in 2008 (Table 2.2.3.1,Table 2.2.4.1). This 
was due to their socioeconomic condition in respect of farming. 
       
Figure 5.1.1 Farming category in the study area as well as in Bangladesh  
Source: BBS, 2011, Source: DAE, 2013 
Unequal distribution of income is generated from unequal distribution of land ownership. 
From the depiction of distribution of land ownership among the households it is found that 
2%hh owned 25% of land, 10% hh owned 53% of land and the rest 88% hh owned only 22% 
of land in the country in 1979.  There was absolutely unequal distribution. As a result 80% 
household enjoyed 20% of income and rest of 20% household enjoyed 80% income in 1980. 
In the end of nineteenth century tenure complexity reached its highest, 10-15 layers occupied 
the intermediary interest who all shared the peasant surplus. In this scenario, poorest and 
upper richer group increased and middle income group decreased (Ullah, 1996). Again, it is 
found that land ownership pattern affects per hectare gross revenue by using the efficient use 
of inputs under different land tenure system. In case of Bangladesh, about one-fifth of the 
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total operated area is under some kind of tenancy arrangements with share cropping covering 
about one-half of the land (Tenaw and et al., 2009).  
It is found based on the studies (Ahmed, 2012; Asadullah, 2005) as evidence in case of 
Bangladesh that the terms of tenancy in Bangladesh were very oppressive. In large portion of 
the cases, the share of land owner was 50 percent of the produced crops as rent without 
sharing any parts of the cost and at least 5 per cent of the cases the share of rent was more 
than 50 per cent (Ullah, 1996). 
 It is also detected from study that, there was a negative impact of rental cost on the contract 
choice of cash rental arrangements (Bamatraf, 2000). 
Technical efficiency varies due to adaptation of proper varieties (Barmon, 2013). Again, it is 
also found based on the study that, in cultivation of high yielding varieties, if input cost is 
shared by the land owner then the adaptation rate becomes higher. But if this input cost is not 
shared by the land owner then this adaptation rate becomes lower in case of share cropping 
arrangement. But this adaptation rate becomes highest in case of cash rental arrangement 
(Hossain, 1991). 
Moreover, it is found from a conducted study in Bangladesh truly depicted based on land 
reform ordinance 1984 scenario that, in one-half tenancy system of share cropping- the total 
produce was shared between owner and tenant farmers in a 50:50 ratio. In that case the owner 
shared around 20 percent of the input cost, mostly the cost of seed and part of the land 
preparation cost. The rest 80 percent of the production cost - irrigation, fertilizer, pesticide 
and harvesting was borne by the tenant.  Financially solvent tenant never took land under 
one–half tenancy system. On the other hand, in two- third system of share cropping 
arrangement- tenant farmers got two-thirds of the total produce; in that case, owner farmers 
did not contribute in any input cost. The higher share for the tenant, result into higher 
investment and consequently generate higher land productivity in this two- thirds system of 
share cropping. As a result it is found that two- thirds system of share cropping was at least 5-
20% more productive than one- half system (CIRDAP, 2009).  
After independence, proper measures were taken for the improvement of agricultural 
production as well as proper use of agricultural lands in the country by adapting necessary 
strategies to establish security and incentive measures by materializing the claim of Tebhaga 
(Three shares) movement in tenancy system including deregulation of input supply policy 
and introducing agricultural credit by the government of Bangladesh (Fujita, 2010). Land 
reform ordinance 1984 was formulated and declared for the security and incentive in tenancy 
system as well as better utilization of agricultural lands in the country. Before this land 
  
52 
 
reform ordinance 1984 tenancy right was not addressed properly, measures were taken to 
improve this tenancy right as well as betterment of agricultural production for the required 
utilization of agricultural lands by this land reform ordinance 1984 to attain the above 
mentioned research based fruitful outcome in agricultural production.  
 
5.2 Research Location and Methodology 
This study was carried out at Basail upazila of Tangail district in Bangladesh based on 150 
respondents.50 respondents were taken equally for each category by stratified random 
sampling technique to trace out the agricultural production in the different land tenure 
arrangements based on the cultivated crops in a cropping year. The major cultivated crops in 
the study area were HYV Boro and T. Aman. B. Aman, mustard, jute, wheat or pulses were 
cultivated as minor crops. Normally two or three crops were cultivated in each plot of land 
among these crops in a year. Gross revenue of the farmers was calculated based on these 
cultivated crops in their operated farm area including obtained gross revenue from paddy cum 
fish farming. In calculating this gross revenue, the produced quantity of crops was multiplied 
by per unit market price of that concerned crop but in case of paddy cum fish farming the 
obtained gross revenue from paddy cum fish farming was taken into account considering the 
subsidized fingerlings from the government. Moreover, evidence suggests that concurrent 
paddy cum fish farming systems can improve paddy yields by as much as 10- 20 per cent in 
Bangladesh, possibly due to better mulching, fertilization of soils through fish waste, and 
better weed control (Dey et al. 2012). These issues were considered accordingly. This paddy 
cum fish farming is the one of the innovative ideas of the farmers to earn more revenue from 
the best utilization of the land resource in crop cultivation. 
In calculating the total production cost of the farmers land use cost, human labor, mechanized 
power (in the study area draft/animal power for tillage was replaced by mechanized power 
tiller), seed, irrigation and material cost were taken into account. 
In addition, the opportunity cost of home supplied inputs was considered including home 
supplied labor also. Rental cost of share cropped land was taken based on the value of the 
half of the produced crop of the share cropped land considering the other sharing aspects of 
half of the share- this was practiced only for major crops but this was not practiced for minor 
crops (e.g. In cultivation of T. Aman in the share cropped land of owner cum tenant farmers, 
no rental cost was needed as owner cum tenant farmers received the advantage in cultivation 
of this T. Aman free of land use cost/without rental cost in their share cropped land according 
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to the condition to provide half of the produce of the HYV Boro to the land owner), other 
benefits those were provided to the share croppers by the land owner in this 50: 50 crop 
sharing system (e.g. share croppers were provided the advantage of paddy cum fish farming 
without rental cost in the condition in providing half of the share of major crops also). These 
issues were considered accordingly. Irrigation cost was calculated as one fourth of the 
produced crop according to the prevailing customary rule, but in practice- this irrigation cost 
depends on needed period of irrigation, times of irrigation, level of land etc. In calculating 
this irrigation cost these related matters were considered accordingly also. Mortgaged cost of 
land was taken based on the paid amount and other concerned aspects in the study area. 
Basically, this mortgaged cost depends on the interest rate of the available credit sources of 
the farmers. This interest rate varied between formal and informal credit sources. In the study 
area owner farmers were cultivating mortgaged land also and mortgaged cost in owner 
farmers mortgaged land and owner cum tenant farmers mortgaged land was different based 
on their socioeconomic condition and available credit sources of the farmers. Land use cost 
was taken based on the mortgaged cost of owner as well as owner cum tenant farmers in 
calculating cost of production. The material cost was calculated including the cost of 
chemical fertilizer, weedicide and pesticide for all the cultivated land categories. Net revenue 
(NR) was calculated gross revenue subtracting the total cost of production (NR = 𝐺𝑅 − 𝑇𝐶), 
where GR=gross revenue and TC= total cost of production. 
It was found in the study area that if half of the seed cost was provided to the tenant by the 
land owner then land owner claimed half of the produced by-product. But sometimes without 
sharing this seed cost the half of the produced by-product was claimed also based on 
customary rule. To avoid this complexity the price of the by product was not taken into 
consideration to calculate the gross revenue.  
The stratified random sampling technique was needed as the percentages of owner, owner 
cum tenant and tenant farmers were very disproportionate in the study area (Figure 5.1.1). 
Then the collected data were analyzed by using statistical analytical software STATA13. 
BCR was used to identify the profitability of crop cultivation in crop wise as well as land 
category wise based on the different categories of lands under different land tenure 
arrangements in the study area. This BCR is the ratio of gross revenue and total cost. 
BCR=
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠⁡𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙⁡𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡
 . Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was used to get the mean difference of 
net revenue among owner, owner cum tenant and tenant farmers based on overall study area. 
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5.3 Result and discussion 
5.3.1 Farm size and other socioeconomic characteristics 
Tables (5.3.1.1, 5.3.1.2, 5.3.1.3) present the farm size and other socioeconomic characteristics 
of the sample households. In this study, farm size is considered based on operated farm size 
to detect the agricultural production in the prevailing different land tenure arrangements. This 
farm size in cultivation of owner owned and mortgaged land is 0.73 and 0.53 ha respectively. 
The farm size in cultivation of owner cum tenant owned, mortgaged and share cropped land 
is 0.75, 0.81 and 0.75 ha respectively. Again the farm size in cultivation of tenant share 
cropped land is 0.71 ha.  But it is found based on study that farm size of 1.01 to 2.02 ha group 
is most efficient in agricultural production in Bangladesh (Bilkis, 2012).  From Table 5.3.1.1, 
it is also found that there is a difference of age of the HHH, off- farm income and other 
socioeconomic characteristics among owner, owner cum tenant and tenant farmers. Moreover, 
tenant farmers are in less advantageous position than owner farmers and even owner cum 
tenant farmers in consideration of all the socioeconomic perspectives. 
 
Table 5. 3.1.1 Socioeconomic characteristics of the sample households 
Variables 
Owner 
Owner cum 
tenant 
Tenant 
Age of the HHH (year) 50.22 (10.43) 50.32 (9.39) 43.62 (9.79) 
Education of the HHH 
(year)   
4.34 (3.55) 3.76 (2.53) 2.16 (1.88) 
Home stead (ha) 0.03 (0.02) 0.03 (0.01) 0.020 
(0.013) 
Family member (LFU) 3.54 (0.86) 3.56 (0.81) 3.14 (0.90) 
Livestock (LSU) 3.06 (1.21) 2.92 (0.68) 2.32 (0.91) 
Off-farm income 
(Tk/year) 
100,270 
(77,068) 
55,000  
(50,598) 
34,828 
(16,178) 
                                        Source：Field survey (2013) 
Note: The name of Bangladesh currency is Taka 1 US Dollar=77.98 Taka Figures and figures 
in the parentheses indicate mean value and Std. Dev. respectively      
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Table 5. 3.1.2 Distribution of respondents by farm category and tenure arrangements 
Farm category Tenure arrangements 
Owned Mortgaged Fixed rented Share cropped 
Owner 50 (100) 15 (30) - - 
Owner cum tenant 50 (100) 7 (14) - 50 (100) 
Tenant - - - 50 (100) 
Source：Field survey (2013) 
Note: Figures in the parentheses indicate percentage of total    
 
Table 5.3.1.3 Farm category and farm size of the respondent farmers 
Farm 
category 
Owner Owner cum tenant Tenant 
Land 
category 
Owner 
owned 
land 
Owner 
mortgaged 
land 
Owner 
cum tenant 
owned 
land 
Owner 
cum tenant 
mortgaged 
land 
Owner 
cum tenant 
share 
cropped 
land 
Share 
cropped 
land 
Farm size 
(ha) 
0.73 (0.56) 0.53 (0.25) 0.75 (0.34) 0.81 (0.27) 0.75 (0.34) 0.71 (0.52) 
Note: Figures and figures in the parentheses indicate mean value and Std. Dev. respectively  
 
5.3.2 Cropping pattern, production and yield in the cultivated area  
There are various cropping patterns prevailing in the study area. This cropping pattern varies 
among the farming categories in cultivation of their crops. The major cropping pattern in the 
owner owned land is mustard- HYV Boro - paddy cum fish farming, but HYV Boro- T. 
Aman - paddy cum fish farming and HYV Boro- B. Aman - paddy cum fish farming patterns 
are also practiced in this land category. The average yield of HYV Boro, mustard, T. Aman 
and B. Aman in Bangladesh is 3.90, 1.95, 2.26 and 1.90 ton/ha respectively (BBS, 2011).This 
average yield is 6.50, 1.00, 2.00 and 1.50 ton/ ha respectively in the study area (DAE, 2011). 
But this average yield among the respondent farmers in owner owned land is 6.54, 0.96, 1.45 
and 1.37 ton/ ha respectively. BR- 28, BR- 29 variety of HYV Boro is commonly cultivated 
in the study area. The average yield of this variety is higher than other cultivated HYV 
variety of Boro.  
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Table 5.3.2.1 Cultivated crops, production and yield in the owner owned land 
Crops Area (ha) Production (Ton) Yield (Ton/ ha) 
HYV Boro (n= 50) 31.47(0.63) 205.71(3.2) 6.54(2.14) 
Mustard (n= 15) 11.34(0.68) 10.84(0.27) 0.96(0.39) 
T. Aman (n= 10) 10.88(0.69) 15.73(0.47) 1.45(0.54) 
B. Aman (n= 10) 4.42(0.67) 6.02(0.29) 1.37(0.32) 
Source：Field survey (2013) 
Note: Figures in the area and production indicate total, figures in the yield indicates mean 
value and figures in the parentheses indicate Std. Dev. respectively  
The dominating cropping pattern in owner mortgaged land is HYV Boro - B. Aman - paddy 
cum fish farming, but some farmers are cultivating some other minor crops also in this owner 
mortgaged land. Farmers are cultivating S.L- 8 variety of HYV Boro in this land category. 
The average yield of this HYV Boro variety is lower than other variety of HYV Boro but 
taste is better than other HYV Boro variety. Owner farmers are cultivating this variety for 
their home consumption though yield is lower and this is affordable for the solvent owner 
farmers. They are also cultivating LV B.Aman in this land category. Due to this the average 
yield of HYV Boro in owner mortgaged land is 2.18 ton/ha and average yield of LV B. Aman 
is 2.04 ton/ha. 
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Table 5. 3.2.2 Cultivated crop, production and yield in the owner mortgaged land 
Crops Area (ha) Production (Ton ) Yield (Ton/ ha) 
HYV Boro (n= 15) 4.99(0.18) 10.88(1.33) 2.18(3.61) 
B. Aman (n= 5) 1.47(0.17) 3.00(0.42) 2.04(0.32) 
Source：Field survey (2013) 
Note: Figures in the area and production indicate total, figures in the yield indicates mean 
value and figures in the parentheses indicate Std. Dev. respectively  
The noticeable cropping pattern in owner cum tenant owned land is mustard- HYV Boro -   
paddy cum fish farming. This mustard is cultivated as cash crop in this land category. The 
average yield of HYV Boro, mustard and T. Aman in owner cum tenant owned land is 5.08, 
0.90 and 1.85 ton/ ha respectively. 
Table 5.3.2.3 Cultivated crop, production and yield in the owner cum tenant owned land 
Crops Area (ha) Production (Ton ) Yield Ton/ ha 
HYV Boro (n= 50) 16.89(0.26) 85.94(1.61) 5.08(1.78) 
Mustard (n =23) 8.28(0.25) 7.49(0.24) 0.90(0.30) 
T. Aman (n= 25) 8.27(0.25) 15.26(0.69) 1.85(0.56) 
Source：Field survey (2013) 
Note: Figures in the area and production indicate total, figures in the yield indicates mean 
value and figures in the parentheses indicate Std. Dev. respectively 
The most common cropping pattern in owner cum tenant mortgaged land is mustard -HYV 
Boro - paddy cum fish farming, but few others minor crops are cultivated also. The average 
yield of HYV Boro and mustard is 5.87 and 0.96 ton/ ha respectively in this land category. 
Table 5.3.2.4 Cultivated crop, production and yield in the owner cum tenant mortgaged land 
Crops Area (ha) Production (Ton) Yield Ton/ ha 
HYV Boro (n=7) 1.81(0.11) 10.63(0.61) 5.87(2.45) 
Mustard (n=3) 1.13(0.13) 1.09(0.12) 0.96(0.42) 
Source：Field survey (2013) 
Note: Figures in the area and production indicate total, figures in the yield indicates mean 
value and figures in the parentheses indicate Std. Dev. respectively  
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Again, the most dominating cropping pattern in owner cum tenant share cropped land is 
mustard-HYV Boro - paddy cum fish farming, but some cost effective crops (e.g. pulses) are 
cultivated also in this land category. The average yield of HYV Boro, mustard and T. Aman 
in this land category is 5.09, 0.93 and 1.29 ton/ ha respectively. 
Table 5.3.2.5 Cultivated crop, production and yield in the owner cum tenant share cropped 
land 
Crops Area (ha) Production (Ton ) Yield Ton/ ha 
HYV Boro (n= 50) 19.04(0.25) 97.09(2.00) 5.09(6.5) 
Mustard (n= 24) 10.54(0.27) 9.79(0.38) 0.93(0.50) 
T. Aman (n= 25) 10.54(0.27) 13.69(0.34) 1.29(0.48) 
Source：Field survey (2013) 
Note: Figures in the area and production indicate total, figures in the yield indicates mean 
value and figures in the parentheses indicate Std. Dev. respectively  
HYV Boro - T. Aman - paddy cum fish farming is the most common cropping pattern in 
tenant share cropped land. Apart from, this, some other flood tolerant crops (e.g. LV B. 
Aman) are cultivated by them to overcome the damage of flood. The average yield of HYV 
Boro, T. Aman and B. Aman in this land category is 5.26, 1.52 and 1.40 ton/ ha respectively. 
Table  5. 3.2.6 Cultivated crop, production and yield in the tenant share cropped land 
Crops Area (ha) Production (Ton ) Yield Ton/ ha 
HYV Boro (n= 50) 35.14(0.52) 184.96(3.48) 5.26(1.91) 
T. Aman (n= 24) 16.92(0.43) 25.65(0.74) 1.52(0.54) 
B. Aman (n= 23) 18.21(0.59) 25.58(1.01) 1.40(0.48) 
Source：Field survey (2013) 
Note: Figures in the area and production indicate total, figures in the yield indicates mean 
value and figures in the parentheses indicate Std. Dev. respectively  
 
5.3.3 Crop wise cultivated area in the study area 
Table 5.3.3.1 presents the crop wise share of cultivated area among the farmers in the study 
area. There was a variation in this share in cultivation of various crops in different land 
categories. But HYV Boro covered the dominant share in all of these categories. 
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Table 5.3.3.1 Percentage distribution of cultivated area of crops in the study area 
Land tenure category Total area 
(ha) 
Crops Crop wise 
Area 
(ha) 
Percentage 
Owner (owned land) 
58.11 HYV Boro 31.47 54.16% 
Mustard 11.34 19.51% 
T. Aman 10.88 18.72% 
B. Aman 4.42 7.61% 
Owner (mortgaged land) 
6.46 HYV Boro 4.99 77.24% 
B. Aman 1.47 22.76% 
Owner cum tenant (owned land) 
33.44 HYV Boro 16.89 50.51% 
Mustard 8.28 24.76% 
T. Aman 8.27 24.73% 
Owner cum tenant(mortgaged  land) 
2.94 Mustard 1.13 38.44% 
HYV Boro 1.81 61.56% 
Owner cum tenant (share cropped land) 
40.12 HYV Boro 19.04 47.46% 
Mustard 10.54 26.27% 
T. Aman 10.54 26.27% 
Tenant ( share cropped land ) 
70.27 HYV Boro 35.14 50.01% 
T. Aman 16.92 24.08% 
B.Aman 18.21 25.91% 
Source：Field survey (2013) Note: Figures indicate mean value  
 
5.3.4 Item wise production cost of major cultivated crops  
Tables (5.3.4.1, 5.3.4.2, 5.3.4.3) present item wise production cost of major cultivated crops. 
From the tables it is found that highest incurred item wise cost was for material cost and the 
lowest incurred item wise cost was for seed in HYV Boro cultivation  both for owner owned 
land and owner cum tenant owned land. But in cultivation of  HYV Boro in in owner cum 
tenant share cropped land and tenant share cropped land , the highest incurred item wise cost 
was for rental cost and the lowest for seed . Again, in cultivation of T. Aman in owner cum 
tenant owned land and owner cum tenant share cropped land the highest item wise cost was 
incurred for human labor. The lowest item wise cost was incurred for seed in owner cum 
tenant owned land, but this lowest incurred item wise cost was for rental cost in owner cum 
tenant share cropped land. 
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 This was because, owner cum tenant farmers were getting advantage in cultivation of T. 
Aman without rental cost in the condition to provide 50: 50 share of produced HYV Boro to 
the land owner. This T. Aman cultivation is risky and very often washed away by flood.      
Table 5.3.4.1 Item wise production cost of owner owned land and owner cum tenant owned land in 
HYV Boro (Taka/ha) 
Variables Owner owned land (cost) Owner cum tenant owned land (cost) 
Land use cost 4,931(3,620) 1,812(1,206) 
Human labor 7,918(3,655) 4,045(1,825) 
Power tiller 2,001(715) 1,086(557) 
Seed 1,295(693) 676(414) 
Material cost 12,040(5,737) 6,077(2,685) 
Irrigation 10,670(4,816) 5,676(2,925) 
Source：Field survey (2013) 
Note: Figures and figures in the parentheses indicate mean value and Std. Dev. respectively  
 
Table 5.3.4.2 Item wise production cost of owner cum tenant share cropped land and tenant share 
cropped land in HYV Boro (Taka/ha) 
Variables Owner cum tenant  (cost) Tenant  (cost) 
Rental cost 9,764(7,808) 17,697(11,537) 
Human labor 4,263(1,836) 7,421(2,370) 
Power tiller 1,187(586) 2,083(351) 
Seed 585(515) 638(844) 
Material cost 4,941(3,026) 9,482(4,198) 
Irrigation 5,259(3,146) 9,537(4,021) 
Source：Field survey (2013) 
Note: Figures and figures in the parentheses indicate mean value and Std. Dev. respectively  
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Table 5. 3.4.3 Item wise production cost of T. Aman in owner cum tenant owned land and 
owner cum tenant share cropped land (Taka/ha) 
Variables Owner cum tenant owned land 
(cost) 
Owner cum tenant share 
cropped land (cost) 
Land use cost 604(524) N/A 
Land rental cost N/A - 
Human labor 1,892(869) 2,235(905) 
Power tiller 1,101(628) 1,331(653) 
Seed 531(311) 362(354) 
Material cost 1,773(854) 1,625(996) 
Source：Field survey (2013) 
Note: Figures and figures in the parentheses indicate mean value and Std. Dev. respectively  
 
5.3.5 Per unit price of produced crop and input 
Table 5.3.5.1 presents per unit price of crops and inputs. From the table, it is found that 
owner and tenant farmers obtain the equal price and this price is lower than obtained price of 
owner cum tenant farmers from HYV Boro. This might be due more concern of owner cum 
tenant famers about market price than both owner and tenant farmers and other related 
aspects of the farmers in getting the per unit price.  In T. Aman, highest per unit price is 
obtained by tenant farmers and lowest by owner cum tenant farmers. This might be tenant 
farmers are more concerned about market price of T. Aman than owner or, owner cum tenant 
farmers. Again, there is a variation among the per unit input price of owner, owner cum 
tenant and tenant farmers in getting various inputs based on their socioeconomic perspectives 
in crop cultivation. 
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Table 5.3.5.1 per unit price of crops and inputs 
 Variable HYV Boro T. Aman 
Owner Owner 
cum 
tenant 
Tenant Owner Owner 
cum 
tenant 
Tenant 
Per unit price of 
produced crop 
 
HYV Boro/  
T. Aman ( Taka/ 
ton) 
13,333
(4,373) 
14,186 
(4,666) 
13,333 
 (4,826) 
16,000 
(5,920) 
14,906  
(4,880) 
16,373 
(5,773) 
Per unit price of 
input 
 
Human 
labor( Taka/m-d) 
300 
(138) 
307 
 (138) 
309 
 (98) 
309 (118) 310 
(146) 
316  
(97) 
Seed (Taka/kg) 35 
 (18) 
53 (32) 85 (32) 35 (13) 35 (21) 67 
(24) 
Urea (Taka/kg) 20 
(9) 
18 (8) 19 (8) 20 (3) 19 (10) 20 
(10) 
TSP (Taka/kg) 26 
(13) 
25 (13) 26 (12) 26 (3) 27 (14) 28  
(14) 
MOP(Taka/kg) 15 
(7) 
15(7) 12 (6) 13 (2) 15 (8) 15 
(8) 
Source：Field survey (2013)  
Note: Figures and figures in the parentheses indicate mean value and Std. Dev. respectively  
 
5.3.6 Crop wise revenues and total cost of major cultivated crops  
Table 5.3.6.1 depicts the gross revenue, total production cost and net revenue of different 
cultivated crops of the farmers. 
Gross revenue:  
In HYV Boro cultivation, obtained gross revenue in owner owned land is higher than that of 
owner cum tenant owned land or, owner cum tenant share cropped land. Again, in cultivation 
of T.Aman, obtained gross revenue in owner cum tenant owned land is higher than owner 
cum tenant share cropped land also. In cultivation of other crops, the highest gross revenue is 
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obtained by owner mortgaged land and lowest by owner owned land. This obtained gross 
revenue varies due to cultivation of different varieties and other concerned factors of 
agricultural production including obtained per unit price.   
Total cost:  
In HYV Boro cultivation, the highest total cost is incurred by owner owned land, the lowest 
by owner cum tenant owned land. In cultivation of T. Aman, incurred total cost is higher in 
owner cum tenant owned land than owner cum tenant share cropped land. In cultivation of 
other crops, the highest incurred total cost is by owner mortgaged land lowest by owner cum 
tenant owned land. This total cost varies due to eco-friendly oriented farming and other 
concerned issues in agricultural production.  
Net revenue: 
In HYV Boro cultivation, highest net revenue is obtained by owner cum tenant owned land 
and lowest by tenant share cropped land. In cultivation of T.Aman, obtained net revenue in 
owner cum tenant owned land is higher than owner cum tenant share cropped land. In 
cultivation of other crops, the highest net revenue is obtained by owner mortgaged land and 
the lowest by owner owned land. This obtained net revenue varies due to lack of proper input 
use, high rental cost of share cropped land and other related matters concerning net revenue 
of the farmers. 
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Table 5. 3.6.1 Revenues and cost of major cultivated crop cultivation 
Land tenure category 
Number of 
respondent 
farmer 
Gross revenue 
(Taka/ha) 
 
Total cost 
(Taka/ha) 
 
Net revenue 
(Taka/ha) 
 
HYV Boro 
Owner (owned land) (n=50) 87,157(28,589) 38,855(13,715) 48,302(22,070) 
Owner cum tenant (owned land) (n= 50) 72,305(23,778) 19,372(9,215) 52,933(17,740) 
Owner cum tenant (share cropped land) (n=50) 60,750(87,044) 25,9 99(11,450) 34,751(11,005) 
Tenant ( share cropped land ) (n=50) 70,181(25,521) 46,858(9,723) 23,323(12,150) 
 T. Aman 
Owner cum tenant (owned land) (n=25) 27,082(26,965) 5,901(3,005) 21,181(5,912) 
Owner cum tenant (share cropped land) (n=25) 21,801(25,011) 5,553(3,530) 16,248(3,690) 
Other crops 
Owner (owned land) - 3,343(3,258) 12,738(1,362) 10,131(7,368) 
Owner (mortgaged land) - 70,000(64,993) 34,654(21,897) 43,341(22,104) 
Owner cum tenant (owned land) - - 411(399) 11,732(5,919) 
Owner cum tenant(mortgaged  land) - 50,000(44,123) 14,926(11,219) 40,483(14,017) 
Owner cum tenant (share cropped land) - - 15,466(4,090) 12,642(3,776) 
Tenant ( share cropped land ) - 17,319(3,743) 15,466(7,257) 17,094(4,055) 
Source：Field survey (2013) 
Note: Figures and figures in the parentheses indicate mean value and Std. Dev. respectively  
Net revenues from other crops are the difference between obtained net revenues from the 
cultivated major crops and other cultivated minor crops    
5.3.7 Crop- wise Benefit Cost Ratio (BCR) of the major cultivated crops of the farmers 
Table 5.3.7.1 presents crop- wise BCR of the different categories of land among farmers 
under different tenure arrangements in the study area. It is depicted that the highest BCR 
(4.58) is obtained by owner cum tenant farmers from owned land in cultivation of T. Aman 
and the lowest BCR (1.49) is obtained by tenant share cropped land in HYV Boro cultivation. 
This was because of high rental cost in providing 50: 50 produced outputs sharing in HYV 
Boro cultivation.  
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Table 5.3.7.1 Crop- wise BCR of the farmers 
HYV Boro 
Land tenure category BCR 
Owner (owned land) 2.24 
Owner cum tenant (owned land) 3.73 
Owner cum tenant (share cropped 
land)  
2.34 
Tenant ( share cropped land)  1.49 
T. Aman 
Owner cum tenant (owned land) 4.58 
Owner cum tenant (share cropped 
land)  
3.93 
Other crops 
Owner (owned land) 0.26 
Owner (mortgaged land) - 
Owner cum tenant (owned land) - 
Owner cum tenant(mortgaged  land) - 
  Owner cum tenant (share cropped 
land) 
- 
Tenant ( share cropped land ) 1.12 
Source: Field survey, 2013 
 
5.4 Land tenure category wise gross revenue of the farmers 
Table 5.4.1 presents the land tenure category wise gross revenue of the farmers. The highest 
gross revenue is obtained by owner cum tenant farmers owned land and the lowest by owner 
cum tenant farmers mortgaged land. This gross revenue varies due to lack of proper intensive 
use of land, available supply of high yielding varieties of seed and favorable market price of 
the produce. 
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Table 5.4.1 Gross revenue of the farmers (Taka/ha) 
Land tenure category 
Gross revenue 
from crop 
Gross revenue 
from paddy-
Fish(P-F) 
Total gross 
revenue 
Percentage of 
obtained gross 
revenue from 
P-F 
Owner (owned land) 90,500(32,247) 19,526(6,604) 110,026(38,852) 17.75% 
Owner (mortgaged land) 70,000(64,993) 7,995(7,221) 77,995(72,215) 10.25% 
Owner cum tenant (owned land) 99,387(31,031) 12,143(4,636) 111,530 (35,667) 10.89 % 
Owner cum tenant(mortgaged  
land) 
50,000(44,123) 5,409(4,363) 
55,409(48,486) 
9.76% 
Owner cum tenant (share cropped 
land) 
82,551(27,273) 12,622(10,445) 
95,173 (130,567) 
13.26 % 
Tenant ( share cropped land ) 87,500(29,264) 15,241(4,764) 102,741(34,028) 14.83% 
Source：Field survey (2013) 
Note: Figures and figures in the parentheses indicate mean value and Std. Dev. respectively  
5.5 Item wise production cost in the different land tenure category 
 Tables (5.5.1, 5.5.2, 5.5.3) present item based land tenure category wise production cost of 
the famers. This item based land category wise production cost varies among the farmers 
according to their socioeconomic condition in getting these inputs in the cultivation process. 
From the tables, it is found that the highest incurred item wise cost was for material and the lowest 
incurred item wise cost was for seed in both owner owned land and owner cum tenant owned land. In 
cultivation of mortgaged land, the highest incurred item wise cost was for material in owner 
mortgaged land but this highest item wise cost was incurred for human labor in owner cum tenant 
mortgaged land. Again, seed was the lowest item wise cost both for owner mortgaged land as well as 
owner cum tenant mortgaged land. In cultivation of share cropped land the highest item wise incurred 
cost was for land rental and the lowest incurred item wise cost was for seed in both in owner cum 
tenant share cropped as well as tenant share cropped land.   
Table 5.5.1 Production cost of owned land (Taka/ha) 
Variables Owner (cost) Owner cum tenant (cost) 
Land use cost 6,575 (4,827) 2,416 (1,609) 
Human labor 11,878 (5,483) 6,067 (2,738) 
Power tiller 4,002 (1,430) 2,173 (1,115) 
Seed 2,590 (1,386) 1,353 (828) 
Material cost 15,878 (7,862) 7,999 (3,753) 
Irrigation 10,670 (4,816) 5,676 (2,925) 
Source：Field survey (2013) 
Note: Figures and figures in the parentheses indicate mean value and Std. Dev. Respectively 
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Table 5.5.2 Production cost of mortgaged land (Taka/ ha) 
Variables Owner (cost) Owner cum tenant (cost) 
Land mortgage cost 6,575 (4,827) 2,416 (1,609) 
Human labor 7,322 (2,687) 6,452 (5,954) 
Power tiller 2,406 (792) 2,036 (945) 
Seed 1,621(932) 1,067 (739) 
Material cost 9,589 (2,460) 1,702 (3,546) 
Irrigation 7,141(2,494) 1,253 (3,097) 
Source：Field survey (2013) 
Note: Figures and figures in the parentheses indicate mean value and Std. Dev. respectively  
  
Table 5.5.3 Production cost of share cropped land (Taka/ ha) 
Variables Owner cum tenant (cost) Tenant (cost) 
Land rental cost 9,764 (7,808) 23,597(15,379) 
Human labor 6,394 (2,754) 11,132 (3,556) 
Power tiller 2,374 (1,173) 4,166 (702) 
Seed 1,170 (1,031) 1,276 (1,688) 
Material cost 6,571 (4,054) 12,616 (5,670) 
Irrigation 5,259 (3,146) 9,537 (4,021) 
Source：Field survey (2013) 
Note: Figures and figures in the parentheses indicate mean value and Std. Dev. respectively  
 
5.6 Total production cost of different land tenure category 
Table 5.6.1 depicts the land tenure category wise total production cost of the farmers. The 
highest total cost is incurred by tenant share cropped land and the lowest by owner cum 
tenant mortgaged land.  
This cost of production varies in cultivation of land by different tenure categories due to 
government supplied subsidized seed, fingerlings and different socioeconomic condition of 
the farmers in their production process.  
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Table 5.6.1 Total cost of the farmers (Taka/ha) 
Land category Total cost 
Owner (owned land) 51,593(15,077) 
Owner (mortgaged land) 34,654 (21,897) 
Owner cum tenant (owned land) 25,684(12,371) 
Owner cum tenant ( mortgaged land) 14,926 (11,239) 
Owner cum tenant (share cropped land) 31,532(15,540) 
Tenant ( share cropped land ) 62,324(16,980) 
Source：Field survey (2013) 
Note: Figures and figures in the parentheses indicate mean value and Std. Dev. respectively  
5.7 Land category wise BCR of the farmers 
Figure 5.7.1 presents BCR of the different categories of land among farmers under various 
land tenure arrangements in the study area. 
It is found that the highest BCR (4.34) is obtained by owner cum tenant farmers from owned 
land and the lowest BCR (1.65) is obtained by tenant share cropped land.   
Again, the BCR in both owner mortgaged land (2.25) and owner cum tenant mortgaged land   
(3.71) is higher than this tenant share cropped land. This obtained BCR in mortgaged land is 
needed to compare with tenant share cropped land, because owner cum tenant farmers are 
getting some subsidized input support from the government but tenant farmers are not getting 
this support. 
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Figure 5.7.1 Benefit Cost Ratio (BCR) of crop cultivation under different land tenure 
arrangements 
 
From the foregoing discussion, it can be discerned that there is a potentiality of agricultural 
improvement by encouraging mortgage system in providing short term agricultural credit 
support for the farmers. Implementation of this mortgaged system might be helpful to lead to 
attain higher BCR attaining higher gross production for the betterment of agricultural 
production in Bangladesh. 
5.8 Land tenure category wise net revenue of the farmers   
Table 5.8.1 presents the land tenure category wise net revenue of the farmers.From the net 
revenue analysis of different farming categories, it is found that the obtained net revenue in 
owner operated owned land is higher than owner operated mortgaged land. Owner cum tenant 
operators obtain higher net revenue in owned land than that of mortgaged and share cropped 
land. The highest net revenue is obtained by owner cum tenant owned land. The lowest by the 
tenant share cropped land. This net revenue varies due to high rental cost of share cropped 
land, per unit price of output as well as input. 
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Table 5.8.1 Net revenue of the farmers (Taka/ha) 
Land tenure category Net revenue 
Owner (owned land) 58,433(29,438) 
Owner (mortgaged land) 43,341 (22,104) 
Owner cum tenant (owned land) 85,846(23,659) 
Owner cum tenant ( mortgaged land) 40,483 (14,017) 
Owner cum tenant (share cropped land) 63,641(14,781) 
Tenant ( share cropped land ) 40,417(16,205) 
Source：Field survey (2013) 
Note: Figures and figures in the parentheses indicate mean value and Std. Dev. respectively  
 
5.9 Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) for the Net revenue of the farmers 
The result reveals that, the mean difference among net revenue in the different cultivated 
tenure categories of land of owner, owner cum tenant and tenant farmers are statistically 
significant difference from zero (Table 5.9.1), indicates that there was a significant difference 
among the net revenue in the different tenure categories of land of the owner, owner cum 
tenant and tenant farmers. 
Table 5.9.1 summary of ANOVA of the net revenue in the cultivated land of owner, owner 
cum tenant and tenant farmers 
   
Land tenure category Net revenue (Taka/ha) P value 
Owner owned land (n= 50) 58,433 (29,438)  0.0000*** 
Owner mortgaged land (n=15 ) 43,341 (22,104) 
Owner cum tenant owned land (n=50 )  85,846(23,659) 
Owner cum tenant mortgaged land (n= 7) 40,483(14,017) 
Owner cum tenant share cropped land (n=50 ) 63,641(14,781) 
Tenant share cropped land (n= 50) 40,417 (16,205) 
Note: Number of observation: 222 Figures and figures in the parentheses indicate mean value 
and Std. Dev. respectively ***Significant at 1% level of significance  
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5.10. Output and input cost sharing between land owner and tenant farmers 
Though, according to the land reform ordinance 1984, tenant will provide human labor, land 
will be provided by the land owner, rest others input costs will be shared between land owner 
and tenant farmers equally and produced output will be shared on the same ratio. But in 
practice output sharing is conducted between land owner and tenant farmers properly 
according to this land reform ordinance 1984 but input cost sharing are not practiced 
accordingly except irrigation (Table 5.10.1). As a result, obtained gross revenue of the tenant 
farmers is 102,741 Taka/ ha, total cost except input cost sharing 62,324 Taka/ha and total cost 
with input cost sharing 48,527 Taka/ ha. This total cost is 57,556 after sharing irrigation cost 
(Source table 5.4.1, 5.5.3).Those give the BCR=
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠⁡𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙⁡𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡
 = 2.12, if cost were shared 
properly; but in reality, the obtained BCR for the tenant farmer is 1.78 after sharing irrigation 
cost only. 
Table 5.10.1 Output and input cost sharing ratio between land owner and tenant farmers  
Variables Sharing ratio 
 Owner Tenant 
Output 50 50 
Input:   
Power tiller - 100 
Seed - - 
Fertilizer - 100 
Irrigation 50 50 
Weedicide - 100 
Over all 34.56% 65.44% 
Source: Field survey (2013) 
 
5.11 Conclusion and Recommendation 
In conclusion, it is concluded that there was a crop wise variation in obtained BCR as well as 
net revenue in cultivation of different types of crops among the farmers; again noticeable 
difference was there in cultivation of various land categories. Tenant farmers obtained both 
lowest BCR and lowest net revenue among these categories. Rental cost of share cropped 
land, socioeconomic infrastructure and favorable cultivation process including proper land 
tenure arrangements play a vital role in obtained net revenue of the farmers. Proper policy 
implementation maintaining the equity issue in land tenure arrangements is needed for the 
betterment of this net revenue of the cultivators, which will create a viable socioeconomic 
infrastructure as well as better atmosphere for the agricultural production. 
  
72 
 
Implementation of this equity issue of land reform ordinance 1984 might be helpful to lead to 
attain higher net revenue for the tenant farmers as well as higher gross production in share 
cropping arrangements having favorable cultivation process and technological transformation 
for the betterment of agricultural production in Bangladesh. 
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Chapter 6.Technical Efficiency of the Farmers of Basail Upazila in Bangladesh: 
Stochastic Frontier Approach 
6.1 Introduction 
Agriculture is the backbone of the economy of Bangladesh. The contribution of agriculture 
sector in the share of gross domestic product is 23.50% and this sector contributes for the 
major share of the total employment in the country (BBS, 2011). The Three farming 
categories of (a) Owner (b) Owner cum tenant and (c) Tenant farmers are prevailing in the 
country based on the tenancy arrangements of (i) share cropping (ii) leasing and (iii) 
mortgaging arrangements.    
Owned land, mortgaged land, leased land and share cropped land are cultivated by these 
farming categories in seven different patterns. Owner farmers cultivate owned land and 
mortgaged land in owner farming. In cultivation of owned land, owner farmers obtain the 
whole amount of produced crop as net revenue after subtracting the production cost. In the 
case of mortgaged land, cultivators need to pay a fixed amount of mortgaged money but need 
not to pay any share of the produced output to the land owner and duration of this mortgaged 
land persist until the mortgaged money can be repaid by the mortgagor (who mortgaged out 
the land).  Owner cum tenant farmers generally cultivate owned land, mortgaged land, leased 
land and share cropped land. In cultivation of the leased land, a certain amount of leased 
money is needed to pay annually to the land owner by the lessee (who leased in the land in 
lease system).The same terms and conditions of mortgaged land is applicable in owner cum 
tenant farmers mortgaged land also.Again tenant farmers cultivate share cropped land only in 
their renting in system in tenant farming by providing half of the produced crop to the land 
owner according to the legal provision of land reform ordinance 1984.This crop sharing is 
applied in case of owner cum tenant share cropped land also. There are some core issues: 
land ownership, size of farm holding, utilization of farming resources of the tenant farmers, 
impact on production, maintain the soil quality and rational way of cultivation are involved in 
cultivating these various categories of land by the owner, owner cum tenant and tenant 
farmers those lead them to attain various level of technical efficiency. In conducting these 
different forms of land tenure arrangements, farm size varies among these various categories 
of farmers. Technical efficiency is related with this farm size of the farmers. 
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 That is depicted based on the study conducted by Rahman et al. (2012), from a farm specific 
technical efficiency of rice grower, it is found that the technical efficiency of large (3.04+ ha), 
medium (up to 3.04 ha), small (up to 1.01 ha) and marginal (less than 0.20 ha) farmers were 
88%, 92%, 94% and 75% respectively, and it is recommended to take initiative to increase 
the technical efficiency of marginal farms.  
According to the land reform ordinance of Bangladesh tenant will provide human labor, land 
will be provided by the land owner and rest other input cost will be shared between the land 
owner and tenant farmers in 50:50 ratio and the produced output will be shared based on the 
same ratio between the land owner and tenant farmers to get proper incentive in agricultural 
production (LRB, 1982).  
Though this legal provision is existed but in practice, output sharing is conducted according 
to this legal provision only but input cost sharing is not practiced properly (Ullah, 1996).  
Measuring technical efficiency (TE) is one of the methods for understanding how farmers 
could maximize the benefits from the proper utilization of existing resources and 
technologies. This method can be conducted adopting production, cost or profit function. 
This production based method is termed as technical efficiency. 
This study analyzes the technical efficiency of different categories of farmers to detect the 
actual production level and deviated from the maximum attainable production level of the 
farmers. This study also identifies the impact of the factors associated with this technical 
efficiency. 
6.2. Research location and methodology 
This study was carried out at Basail upazila of Tangail district in Bangladesh based on 150 
respondents equally 50 for each category. The area of Basail upazila is 158 sq.km, population 
is 176,002. Data were collected by stratified random sampling technique to trace out the 
proper impact on technical efficiency under different land tenure arrangements based on the 
cultivated crops in a cropping year. The major cultivated crops in the study area were HYV 
Boro and T. Aman. B. Aman, mustrd, jute, wheat or pulses were minor crops. Normally two 
or three crops were cultivated in each plot of land among these crops within a year. The 
stratified random sampling technique was needed as the percentages of owner, owner cum 
tenant and tenant farmers were very disproportionate in the   study area (DAE, 2013). Then 
the collected data were analyzed by using statistical analytical software STATA13. Stochastic 
frontier approach was used to measure the technical efficiency of the different categories of 
farmers based on their gross revenue of output ha-1 in the cultivated various types of land. 
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This study considers the stochastic frontier approach with the assumption that the actual 
production cannot exceed the maximum possible production with the given input quantities 
and it is suggested to determine the factors responsible for inefficiency (Aigneret al., 1977 
and Meeusen and van den Broeck, 1977). 
It was used in a two stage procedure.  In first stage TE was computed and in the second stage 
socioeconomic variables of farm households were regressed against this TE using Tobit 
regression method to identify their impact. Since the value of TE is in the range of 0 to1, it 
justifies using Tobit regression technique (Nargis and Lee, 2013; Hossain et al., 2013). 
 
The stochastic frontier model used in this study as follows: 
Ln 𝑌𝑖⁡= β0+β Ln 𝑋𝑖⁡ + 𝑉𝑖⁡- 𝑈𝑖  …     (1) 
Where, logarithm 𝑌𝑖⁡ is the gross revenue of output ha
-1 in different types of cultivated land, β 
is the vector of parameters to be estimated, 𝑋𝑖⁡presents inputs. These inputs includes per 
hectare  cost of human labor, power tiller, seed ,material cost (Cost of fertilizer, insecticides 
and pesticides) ,irrigation and land use cost in various categories of cultivated land of the 
different tenure groups of farmers. Land use cost was taken based on the cultivated land of 
the farmers as ownership patterns as well as cultivated land categories were different among 
owner, owner cum tenant and tenant farmers. This land use cost was taken at the rate of the 
cost of mortgaged land both for owned land and mortgaged land of owner as well as owner 
cum tenant farmers based on their cultivated mortgaged land but this land use cost was taken 
at the rate of the cost of share cropped land of both for owner cum tenant and tenant farmers 
based on their cultivated share cropped land in the study area. It was found in the study area 
that if half of the seed cost was provided to the tenant by the land owner then land owner 
claimed half of the produced by-product,  and even sometimes  without sharing this seed cost 
the half of the produced by- product was claimed also based on customary rule (Practiced 
rule according to custom). To avoid this complexity, price of by-product was not taken into 
account in estimating gross revenue. 𝑉𝑖⁡ Present the error term accounting for random 
variation in gross revenue, due to the factors outside the control of farmers. Another error 
term 𝑈𝑖 presents error associated with farm level inefficiency and this is assumed to have 
zero mean with variance (𝜎𝑢
2)     and distributed half normally. Similarly,⁡𝑉𝑖  is assumed to 
have zero mean and constant variance⁡(𝜎𝑣
2)     and distributed normally with independent with 
each⁡𝑈𝑖 . 
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Both of these error terms are supposed to be uncorrelated with explanatory variables⁡𝑋𝑖. The 
log likelihood function for half normal model is given in equation (2).This likelihood 
function estimates whether the variation among the observation is due to inefficiency. From 
the likelihood function we get 𝜎2 and⁡ℷ2 .   
Where, 𝜎2 = 𝜎𝑢
2 + 𝜎𝑣
2 and ℷ2 = 𝜎𝑢
2/𝜎𝑣
2 . If ℷ=0, it indicates there is no inefficiency effect and 
the variation in the data is due to random noise only. The higher the value of ℷ⁡the more will 
be inefficiency effects explained by the model. 
𝐿𝑛⁡𝐿(𝑌𝑖|𝛽, 𝜎ℷ) = −
1
2
𝐿𝑛(𝜋𝜎2) +∑ 𝐿𝑛∅{
𝑛
𝑖=1⁡
−ℇ𝑖ℷ
𝜎
}-
1
2𝜎2
∑ ℇ𝑖
2⁡
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
 ...               (2) 
Where,𝑌𝑖 ⁡ is the vector log of gross revenue of output ha
-1 in different types of cultivated land 
ℇ𝑖  = ⁡𝑉𝑖−𝑈𝑖  =Ln 𝑌𝑖  -𝑋𝑖⁡𝛽  is the composite error and ∅(𝑋𝑖⁡)  is a cumulative distribution 
function of the standard normal variable evaluated at 𝑋𝑖.   
The TE of the farmers in the context of stochastic frontier function can be expressed as: 
TEi =
𝑌𝑖
𝑌𝑖∗
= 𝑓(𝑋𝑖; 𝛽)exp⁡(𝑉𝑖⁡⁡ −𝑈𝑖)/𝑓(𝑋𝑖; 𝛽)𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑉𝑖) = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝑈𝑖)  …    (3) 
Where,𝑌𝑖∗  is the maximum possible gross revenue of output ha-1 in different types of 
cultivated land, Yi, Xi,⁡𝛽, 𝑉𝑖, 𝑇𝐸𝑖 and Ui are as explained earlier. TEi measures the gross 
revenue of output ha-1 in different types of cultivated land of the farmers relative to the 
maximum possible gross revenue of output ha-1 in different types of cultivated land that can 
be produced using the same cost of input vectors. This value of TEi is 0 to 1. 
If TEi=1, Yi achieves the maximum value of 𝑓(𝑋𝑖⁡; 𝛽)𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑉𝑖).  If TEi is less than 1, that 
indicates the shortfall of gross revenue of output from the maximum possible level. This 
situation is characterized by stochastic elements, which vary among the farmers. The 
following equation (4) was used to identify the impact of socioeconomic variables on TE. 
𝑇𝐸𝑖 = δ0 + 𝛿𝐿𝑛𝑍𝑖 + 𝜔𝑖   …     (4) 
Where, δ presents the parameters associated with socioeconomic variables (𝑍𝑖) and 𝜔𝑖 is the 
error term. The variables for the study were chosen considering both production theory and 
local context of the farmers. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to analyze the mean 
difference of technical efficiency in cultivated different categories of land of the farmers. 
Tobit regression analysis was used to identify the impact of the factors associated with 
technical efficiency. In using this stochastic frontier approach Wald chi2 test shows 
significant result (P= 0.0000), that indicates the fitness of the model. All of these stochastic 
frontier approach, ANOVA and Tobit regression analyses were used based on overall study 
area. 
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 For this regression analysis Tobit regression method was used, because (a) though ordinary 
least square (OLS) is frequently used regression method, but this method requires innovative 
approach. The constraints of OLS and complementary advantages of Tobit model in working 
with censoring data. (b) Tobit model performs more accurately than OLS when data are 
subject to a ceiling or floor effect. (c) Tobit model is an alternative analysis of approach 
according to requirement.    
Before running this Tobit model data were validated using Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
and Breusch- Pagan/ Cook- Weisberg test for multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity 
respectively.  
Table 6.2.1 presents explanatory variables and expected sign of the Tobit model. The 
expected sign of age of the HHH was hypothesized positive. This was because of more age of 
the HHH leads to attain more maturity in farming. Education of the HHH was hypothesized 
positive, as it was found based on the study that in addition to raising rice productivity and 
boosting potential output household education significantly reduces production inefficiencies 
(Asadullah, 2005). The expected sign of land status was hypothesized positive; this was 
because land ownership leads to attain better financing in farming. The expected sign of 
family member was hypothesized positive. This was due to considering better utility of 
family member in farming. The expected sign of farm size was hypothesized positive, as 
larger farm size leads to attain better financial solvency in farming. Off-farm income was 
hypothesized positive, this was because, off-farm income provides better utility in financing 
in farming. Credit was hypothesized positive, as better credit facilities provides better 
financing in farming. Adoption of new crop has better advantages, considering those 
advantages; adoption of new crop was hypothesized positive.  Extension services is helpful to 
keep in touch with the innovative technologies for the farmers in their farming. Considering 
this reason, the expected sign of extension services was hypothesized positive. Value of asset 
was hypothesized positive. This asset has better utility in farming. Considering this utility 
aspect, this value of asset was hypothesized positive. The expected sign of livestock was 
hypothesized positive also. This was due to considering better utility of livestock in farming. 
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Table 6.2.1 Explanatory variables, measurement unit and expected sign of the Tobit model 
Variables Measurement unit Expected 
sign 
Age of the HHH Year + 
Education of HHH Year of formal education + 
Land status of HHH 1= Owner owned land, 2= Owner mortgaged land, 
3=Owner cum tenant owned land, 4=Owner cum tenant 
mortgaged land, 5= Owner cum tenant share cropped land, 
6=Tenant share cropped land  (dummy) 
+ 
Family member LFU + 
Ln farm size Hectare + 
Ln off- farm income  BDT/ Year + 
Credit 1=Yes, 0=No (dummy) + 
Adoption of new crop 1=Yes, 0=No (dummy) + 
Extension services 1=Yes, 0=No (dummy) + 
Value of asset BDT + 
Livestock  LSU + 
 
Note: BDT= Bangladesh Taka, 1 US Dollar=77.98 BDT 
 
6.3 Results and discussion 
(1) Farming category and Socioeconomic characteristics 
Table 6.3.1.1 presents the socioeconomic characteristics of the respondent farmers. Presently 
in Bangladesh the percentages of owner, owner cum tenant and tenant farmers are 65%, 22% 
and 13% respectively ( BBS , 2011).This respective percentages of owner, owner cum tenant 
and tenant farmers in the study area are 48%, 28% and 24% respectively (DAE, 2013). 
The average farm size in cultivation of owner owned land and owner mortgaged land are 0.73 
ha and 0.53 ha respectively. The average farm size in cultivation of owner cum tenant owned 
land, mortgaged land and share cropped land are 0.75 ha, 0.81 ha and 0.75 ha respectively. 
Again, the average farm size in cultivation of tenant share cropped land is 0.71 ha.  
The percentage of credit facility availing farmers in cultivation of both owner owned land and 
mortgaged land is 98%.  This percentages of credit facility availing farmers in cultivation of 
owner cum tenant owned, mortgaged and share cropped land are 98%, 98% and 94% 
respectively. Again this percentage of credit facility availing farmers in cultivation of tenant 
share cropped is 0. 
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 Tenant farmers are not getting any credit from formal sources due to lack of collateral. 
Though tenant farmers should get collateral right of rented land according to the legal 
provision of land reform ordinance 1984 (LRB, 1982). 
 The interest rate between formal and informal credit sources varies significantly in the study 
area. This interest rate is 6% for the agricultural credit received from formal sources, but this 
interest rate becomes 18% for the credit received from informal sources (DAE, 2013). 
The mean value of asset in cultivation of owner owned land and owner mortgaged land are 
481,164 BDT and 653,333 BDT respectively. The mean value of asset in cultivation of owner 
cum tenant owned land, mortgaged land and share cropped land are 369,600 BDT, 118,571 
BDT and 360,600 BDT respectively. Again, the mean value of asset in cultivation of tenant 
share cropped land is 50,164 BDT. 
 
 From the discussion of socioeconomic characteristics of the farmers, it is concluded that 
tenant farmers are in most dis-advantageous position in farming among these different tenure 
categories of farmers in consideration of farm size and all other socioeconomic aspects.  
 
 
 
  
80 
 
Table 6.3.1.1 Socio- economic characteristics of the sample households 
Variables Owner owned land 
(n= 50) 
 
Owner mortgaged 
land (n= 15) 
Owner cum tenant 
owned land (n= 50) 
Owner cum 
tenant mortgaged 
land (n=7) 
Owner cum tenant 
share cropped 
land (n=50) 
Tenant share cropped 
land (n= 50) 
Mean 
(SD) 
Range Mean 
(SD) 
Range Mean (SD) Range Mean 
(SD) 
Range Mean 
(SD) 
Range Mean (SD) Range 
Age of the 
HHH (Year) 
50.22 
(10.43) 
30-72 50.73 
(11.64) 
32-72 50.32 (9.39) 32-65 46.42 
(13.74) 
32-65 50.32 
(9.39) 
32-65 43.62 (9.79) 22-65 
Education of 
the HHH 
(Year) 
4.34 
(3.55) 
0-14 5.40 
(4.73) 
0-14 3.76 (2.53) 0-14 3.42 
(1.51) 
2-5 3.76 
(2.53) 
0-14 2.16 (1.88) 0-8 
Family 
member(LFU) 
3.54 
(0.86) 
2-5 3.73 
(0.96) 
2-5 3.56 (0.81) 2-5 2.85 
(0.69) 
2-4 3.56 
(0.81) 
2-5 3.14 (0.90) 2-5 
Farm size (ha) 0.73 
(0.56) 
0.23-
4.08 
0.53 
(0.25) 
0.22-
0.91 
0.75 (0.34) 0.23-
2.26 
0.81 
(0.27) 
0.34-
1.02 
0.75 
(0.34) 
0.23-
2.26 
0.71 (0.52) 0.23-
2.72 
Off- farm 
income 
(BDT) 
100,270 
(77,068) 
0-
240,000 
84,733 
(79,028) 
0-
240,000 
55,000(50,598) 0-
240,000 
28,000 
(23,180) 
12,000-
80,000 
55,000 
(50,598) 
0-
240,000 
34,828(16,178) 0-
84,000 
Extension 
services 
availing 
farmer % 
20 - 27 - 0 - 0 - 12 - 2 - 
Credit 
availing 
farmer % 
98 - 98 - 98 - 98 - 94 - 0 - 
New crop 
adopting 
farmer % 
100 - 100 - 100 - 100 - 94 - 94 - 
Weed 
management 
adopting 
farmer % 
20 - 27 - 0 - 0 - 12 - 2 - 
Value of asset 
(BDT) 
481,164 
(191,749) 
70,000-
800,000 
653,333 
(546,321) 
200,000-
4000,000 
369,600 
(361,146) 
40,000-
4000,000 
118,571 
(58,431) 
50,000-
200,000 
360,600 
(50,779) 
40,000-
3500,000 
50,164(25,000) 12,000-
400,000 
Livestock 
(LSU) 
3.06(1.21) 0.7-9.1 2.24 
(0.76) 
0.7-3.2 2.92 (0.68) 0.7-3.1 5.50 
(4.50) 
3.3-
6.50 
2.92 
(0.68) 
0.3-4.2 2.32 (0.91) 0.30-
4.10 
Source: Field survey (2013) Note: n= Observation, SD= Standard deviation
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(2)  Study variables 
Table 6.3.2.1 presents the mean and standard deviation of the study variables. The mean gross revenue of 
owner owned and mortgaged land is 110,026 BDT ha-1 and 77,995 BDT ha-1 respectively. The mean 
gross revenue of owner cum tenant owned, mortgaged and share cropped land is 111,530 BDTha-1 ,55,409 
BDT ha-1 and 95,173 BDT ha-1 respectively. Again, the mean gross revenue in tenant share cropped land 
is 102,741 BDTha-1. The average cost of human labor in cultivation of owner owned and mortgaged land 
is 11,878 BDT ha-1 and 7,322 BDT ha-1 respectively. The average human labor cost in owner cum tenant 
owned, mortgaged and share cropped land is 6,067 BDT ha-1,6,452 BDT ha-1and 6,394 BDT ha-1 
respectively. Again the average human labor cost in tenant share cropped land is 11,132 BDT ha-1. 
Average cost of power tiller in cultivation of owner owned and mortgaged land is 4,002 BDT ha-1 and 
2,406 BDT ha-1 respectively. The average power tiller cost in owner cum tenant owned, mortgaged and 
share cropped land  is 2,173 BDT ha-1, 2,036 BDT  ha-1 and 2,374 BDT ha-1 respectively. Again the 
average power tiller cost in tenant share cropped land is 4,166 BDT ha-1 .The average cost of seed in 
cultivation of owner owned and mortgaged land is 2,590 BDT ha-1 and 1,621 BDT ha-1 respectively. The 
average seed cost in owner cum tenant owned, mortgaged and share cropped land is 1,353 BDT ha-1, 
1,067 BDT ha-1and 1,170 BDT ha-1 respectively. Again the average seed cost in tenant share cropped land 
is 1,276 BDT ha-1. The average material cost in cultivation of owner owned and mortgaged land is 15,878 
BDT ha-1 and 9,589 BDT ha-1 respectively. The average material cost in owner cum tenant owned, 
mortgaged and share cropped land is 7,999 BDT ha-1,1,702 BDT ha-1and 6,571 BDT ha-1 respectively. 
Again the average material cost in tenant share cropped land is 12,616 BDT ha-1. The average cost of 
irrigation in cultivation of owner owned and mortgaged land is 10,670 BDT ha-1 and 7,141 BDT ha-1 
respectively. The average irrigation cost in owner cum tenant owned, mortgaged and share cropped land 
is 5,676 BDT ha-1,1,253 BDT ha-1and 5,259 BDT ha-1 respectively. Again the average irrigation cost in 
tenant share cropped land is 9,537 BDT ha-1.The average land use cost in cultivation of both owner 
owned land and mortgaged land are 6,575 BDTha-1. The average land use cost in both in owner cum 
tenant owned land and mortgaged land are 2,416 BDT ha-1. Again the mean land use cost in owner cum 
tenant share cropped land and tenant share cropped land are 9,764 BDT ha-1 and 23,597 BDT ha-1 
respectively. The highest land use cost is obtained in the tenant share cropped land and the lowest in 
owner cum tenant mortgaged land. This is because, owner cum tenant farmers are getting some input 
support from the government and they have some bargaining power in getting share cropped land but 
tenant farmers are neither getting this input support nor they have this bargaining power like owner cum 
tenant farmers. This cost of production varies in different categories of cultivated land of the farmers 
based on their socioeconomic condition in conducting their crop cultivation process. 
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Table 6.3.2.1 Mean and standard deviation (SD) of the of the study variables of stochastic frontier model 
Source：Field survey (2013) Note: BDT= Bangladesh Taka, 1 US Dollar=77.98 BDT 
Variables Mean(±SD)Owner 
owned land ( n=50) BDT 
ha-1 
Mean(±SD)Owner 
mortgaged land (n=15) 
BDT ha-1 
Mean(±SD)Owner cum 
tenant owned land (n=50) 
BDT ha-1 
Mean(±SD)Owner cum 
tenant mortgaged land 
(n=7) BDT ha-1 
Mean(±SD)Owner 
cum tenant share 
cropped land (n= 
50) BDT ha-1 
Mean(±SD)Tenant 
share cropped land 
( n=50) BDT ha-1 
 Mean (SD) Range Mean (SD) Range Mean (SD) 
 
Range Mean (SD) Range Mean 
(SD) 
Range Mean 
(SD) 
Range 
Gross revenue  110,026 
(38,852) 
11,690-
234,650 
77,995 
(72,215) 
43,980-
247,000 
111,530 
(35,667) 
7,764-
177,840 
55,409 
(48.486) 
48,800-
172,900 
95,173 
(130,567) 
49,400-
98,800 
102,741 
(34,028) 
73,400-
247,000 
Human labor cost 11,878 
(5,483) 
980-
3,380 
7,322(2,687) 882-
11,761 
6,067(2,738) 1,470-
10,585 
6,452(5,954) 3,308-
22,053 
6,394 
(2,754) 
980-
11,761 
11,132 
(3,556) 
2,205-
16,540 
Power tiller cost 4,002 (1,430) 882-
8,821 
2,406 (792) 882-
3,920 
2,173 
(1,115) 
490-6,616 2,036 (945) 735-
3,308 
2,374 
(1,173) 
490-
6,616 
4,166 
(702) 
2,129-
4,940 
Seed cost 2,590 (1,386 ) 392-
4,631 
1,621(932) 551-
3,528 
1,353 (828) 294-3,528 1,067 (739 ) 441-
2,940 
1,170 
(1,031) 
500-
3,920 
1,276 
(1,688) 
500-
4,442 
Material cost 15,878(7,862) 980-
39,696 
9,589 
(2,460) 
3,528-
14,114 
7,999(3,753) 1,960-
14,114 
1,702(3,546) 1,470-
11,761 
6,571 
(4,054) 
735-
15,122 
12,616 
(5,670) 
3,193-
18,525 
Irrigation cost 10,670 
(4,816) 
441-
22,053 
7,141 
(2,494) 
2,646-
11,761 
5,676 
(2,925) 
1,470-
10,585 
1,253(3,097) 470-
10,585 
5,259 
(3,146) 
735-
11,761 
9,537 
(4,021) 
2,940-
16,540 
Land use cost 6,575 (4,827) 2,205-
49,098 
6,575 
(4,827) 
2,205-
49,098 
2,416 
(1,609) 
816-39,696 2,416(1,609) 816-
39,696 
9,764 
(7,808) 
1,017-
38,593 
23,597 
(15,379) 
6,616-
88,214 
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(3) Stochastic Frontier Production Function 
Table 6.3.3.1 presents the findings from stochastic frontier model. The significant log 
likelihood using the wald test signifies the fitness of the model (P=0.0000). 
Moreover, the likelihood ratio test for the absence of inefficiency in the model criteria was 
rejected (P=0.000). Indicating that the inefficiency effect explained in the model is higher 
than random noise. 
Marginal effects of the relevant input variables were estimated on gross revenue to 
complement the analysis and these marginal effects were used to discuss the effect of the 
concerned explanatory variable on gross revenue of the farmers considering the effect of other 
variables constant. Seed, power tiller and irrigation had positive effect. But human labor, 
material cost and land use cost had negative effect on gross revenue. The marginal effect of 
seed is 0.052, indicates that 1% increase in seed cost leads to increase the gross revenue of 
output ha-1 by 0.052%.This indicates the positive impact of seed on gross revenue in farming. 
The marginal effect of power tiller is 0.481, indicates that 1% increment of power tiller cost 
leads to increase the gross revenue of output ha-1 by 0.481%. This depicts the positive 
association of power tiller in increasing gross revenue in farming. The marginal effect of 
irrigation is 0.213, indicates that 1% increase in irrigation cost leads to increase the gross 
revenue of output ha-1 by 0.213%.This reveals better utility of irrigation in agricultural 
production. The marginal effect of human labor is -0.022, indicating that 1% increase in cost 
of human labor leads to decrease the gross revenue of output ha-1 by 0.022%.This is due to 
under-utilization of family member. The marginal effect of material cost is -0.794, indicating 
that 1% increment in material cost leads to decrease the gross revenue of output ha-1 by 
0.794%. This is due to material cost used in higher price is not economically viable for them 
in compare to cheaper compost and manure. In the study area compost and manure are used in 
a cheaper price, even cost accounting is not calculated properly.  The marginal effect of land 
use cost is -0.002, indicates that 1% increment in land use cost leads to decrease the gross 
revenue of output ha-1 by 0.002%. The reason behind this negative impact of increased land 
use cost is the decreasing impact on net revenue in farming. 
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Table 6.3.3.1 Maximum likelihood estimates and marginal effects 
Variables Coefficients P value Marginal effects 
Human labor cost -0.031 (0.00004) 0.000*** -0.022 
Power tiller cost 0.757 (0.00004) 0.000*** 0.481 
Seed cost 0.107 (0.00001) 0.000*** 0.052 
Material cost -1.092 (0.00001) 0.000*** -0.794 
Irrigation cost 0.302 (0.00005) 0.000*** 0.213 
Land use cost -0.004 (0.00002) 0.000*** -0.002 
Constant 13.30 (0.0001) 0.000***  
Log likelihood:-226.33***σ2= 1.80 ℷ =3.85 likelihood ratio= 1.2*** N= 222, *** indicates 
significant at 1% level of significance 
(4) Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) for the technical efficiency of the farmers 
The result reveals that, the mean difference among technical efficiency in the cultivated 
different categories of land of the owner, owner cum tenant and tenant farmers are statistically 
significant difference from zero (Table 6.3.4.1), indicates that there was a significant 
difference among the technical efficiency of various categories of cultivated land of the 
farmers. 
Table 6.3.4.1 summary of ANOVA of the technical efficiency of the farmers 
Land tenure category Technical efficiency    P value 
Mean (SD) Range 
Owner owned land (n= 50) 0.479 (0.23) 0.058-0.999  0.0000*** 
Owner mortgaged land (n=15 ) 0.569 (0.24) 0.189-0.981 
Owner cum tenant owned land (n=50 )  0.439 (0.17) 0.032-0.767 
Owner cum tenant mortgaged land (n= 7) 0.389 (0.22) 0.196-0.833 
Owner cum tenant share cropped land 
(n=50 ) 
0.340 (0.19) 0.024-0.999 
Tenant share cropped land (n= 50) 0.320 (0.18) 0.022-0.793 
Note: Number of observation: 222 ***Significant at 1% level of significance  
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The result shows that there is 48% mean technical efficiency in owner owned land. Indicates 
that technical efficiency in owner owned land could improve by 52%.This mean technical 
efficiency in owner mortgaged land is 57%, indicates that technical efficiency in owner 
mortgaged land could improve by 43%.   
 The mean technical efficiency in owner cum tenant owned land is 44%. Which indicates that 
this technical efficiency in owner cum tenant owned land could improve by 56%. The mean 
technical efficiency in owner cum tenant mortgaged land is 39%, indicates that technical 
efficiency in owner cum tenant mortgaged land could improve by 61%. The mean technical 
efficiency in owner cum tenant share cropped land is 34%, indicates that technical efficiency 
in owner cum tenant share cropped land could improve by 66%. 
 The mean technical efficiency in tenant share cropped land is 32%, indicates that technical 
efficiency in tenant share cropped land could improve by 68%. 
.The highest technical efficiency is obtained by owner mortgaged land (57%). This is due to 
better advantages in farming in owner mortgaged land. Again the lowest technical efficiency 
is obtained by tenant share cropped land (32%). This is due to lack of proper incentive in 
cultivation of share cropped land. 
 Moreover, it is also found (Table 6.3.4.1) that the highest variation is observed in owner cum 
tenant share cropped land (2.4%-99.9%). This is due to lack of proper incentive in cultivation 
of owner cum tenant share cropped land. Again the lowest variation is observed in cultivation 
of owner cum tenant mortgaged land (19.6%- 83.3%). This might be better advantages in 
cultivation of owner cum tenant mortgaged land.  
 
(5) Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) for the technical efficiency of the owner cum tenant 
and tenant farmers in cultivating share cropped land (addressing cost sharing issue of 
share cropped land in the stochastic frontier model) 
Table 6.3.5.1 presents summary result of the ANOVA in cultivating share cropped land of the 
owner cum tenant and tenant farmers. From the result it is found that there is a statistically 
significant difference from zero among the technical efficiency of owner cum tenant and 
tenant farmers in cultivating share cropped lands in seed cost sharing and not sharing 
condition. From the table it is found that the obtained technical efficiency of seed cost sharing 
arrangement in owner cum tenant sharecropped land (59.10%) is higher than the obtained 
technical efficiency in without seed cost sharing arrangement (54.80%) in cultivation of share 
cropped land. Again, in case of technical efficiency in tenant share cropped land in seed cost 
sharing arrangement (59.70%) is higher than obtained technical efficiency in without seed 
cost sharing arrangement (49.00%). The highest technical efficiency is obtained in tenant 
share cropped land under seed cost sharing arrangement. The reason for attaining this highest 
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technical efficiency might be for getting incentive in seed cost sharing by the land owner as 
well as best working effort of the tenant farmers in their cultivation process. The lowest 
technical efficiency is obtained in tenant share cropped land under without seed cost sharing 
condition. This is due to lack of incentive in not sharing the seed cost by the land owner. 
Table 6.3.5.1 summary of ANOVA of the technical efficiency of the farmers in cultivating 
share cropped land  
Land tenure category Technical efficiency P value 
Mean (SD) Range 0.0899* 
Owner cum tenant share cropped land seed 
cost shared (n=11 ) 
0.591(0.18) 0.291 -0.948 
Owner cum tenant share cropped land seed 
cost not shared (n=39 ) 
0.548 (0.14) 0.291-0.948 
Tenant share cropped land seed cost shared 
(n= 25) 
0.597 (0.15) 0.00001-0.803 
Tenant share cropped land seed cost not 
shared (n= 25) 
0.490 (0.16) 0.203-0.769 
 
Note: Number of observation: 100 *Significant at 10% level of significance  
 
(6) Technical efficiency based on seed cost shared status by two land tenure categories 
 Table 6.3.6.1 presents technical efficiency based on seed cost shared status by two land 
tenure categories. From the table it is found that there is a statistically significant difference 
from zero in all the cases based on seed cost except owner cum tenant share cropped land. 
The reason for this statistically significant difference is due to better incentive of shared seed 
cost by the land owner.  
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Table 6.3.6. 1 Technical efficiency based on seed cost shared status by two land tenure 
categories (Estimation based on seed cost) 
Land tenure 
category 
 Seed cost sharing status  P- value 
Seed cost 
shared 
Mean TE 
(SD) 
Seed cost not 
shared 
Mean TE 
(SD) 
Shared no. of 
observations 
No. of 
observations  
Owner cum 
tenant share 
cropping 
(n=11) 0.591 
(0.18) 
(n=39) 0.548(0.14) 0.4236 
Tenant share 
cropping 
(n=25) 0.597 
(0.15) 
(n=25) 0.490(0.16) 0.0195** 
Total share 
cropping 
(n=36) 0.5860 
(0.16) 
(n=64) 0.5256 
(0.15) 
0.0622* 
Note: ** and * indicate 5% and 10% level of significance 
 
(7) Impact of socioeconomic variables on technical efficiency of the farmers   
Table 6.3.7.1 presents the summary result of the impact of socioeconomic variables. We 
tested eleven socio economic explanatory variables against technical efficiency in Tobit 
regression analysis. These explanatory variables were selected based on production theory 
and local context of the farmers in the light of their production process.   
From the analysis, it is found that the direction of the response of the variable credit was as 
per the hypothesis and this credit had significant positive impact on technical efficiency. This 
is due to better utility of credit in farming. Couples of studies reported similar result (Ahmed, 
2011; Shameen and Chawdhury, 2013; Khondker and et al., 2013).  
The study conducted by Ahmed (2011) on “Technical efficiency of agricultural farms in 
Khulna, Bangladesh” considers three sub-sectors: rice cultivation, fish cultivation and 
livestock rearing in farming and found that there was about 76%, 81% and 73% variations of 
output due to technical inefficiency for the farms of these three sub-sectors respectively. It 
was found that availability of credit significantly and positively affect the efficiency level of 
the farms. 
 From the conducted study by Shameen and Chadhury (2013) on “Agricultural growth and 
agricultural credit in the context of Bangladesh”- it is found that there had been a positive 
correlation between agricultural credit and greater agricultural production.  
The study conducted by Khondker and et al. (2013) on “The role of credit on food production 
and food security in Bangladesh” is a national level conducted study based on 1,200 
households in all over the country including the study area (Tangail district). This study was 
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conducted by the bureau of economic research University of Dhaka with support of the 
national food policy capacity strengthening program of USAID and FAO. The study reveals 
that availability of credit had a significant positive impact on agricultural production. 
 Given a positive association between agricultural credit and agricultural production in this 
study it is recommended to expand the credit disbursement program for the farmers including 
relaxation aspect of collateral for the sake of marginal farmers and landless share croppers. 
 Land status of owner cum tenant was significant but did not show expect sign, this is due to 
lack of proper incentive in cultivation of share cropped land. The study conducted by (Ahmed 
et al., 2002) reported similar findings. According to this study share cropping is less 
technically efficient than owner cultivation and fixed rental due to restrictions imposed on 
them by the land owners, thus in this study it is recommended for the policy to facilitate more 
efficient transections of land between farmers to reduce inefficiencies associated with these 
land tenure arrangements. Farm size was significant but did not show expect sign. Similar 
result was reported in the study conducted by Rahman et al. (2012). The reason for the case of 
farm size, this might be due to extensive use of owned land of the owner farmers as well as 
owner cum tenant farmers. The value of asset was significant but did not show expected sign, 
this finding is similar to the study conducted by Rahman et al.                                                                                                    
(2012).This might be due to extensive use of asset in farming of the owner farmers. Other 
variables did not show significant impact on technical efficiency.    
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  Table 6.3.7.1 Parameter estimates of the Tobit model 
Variables  Coefficients P value 
Age of the HHH 0.119(.07) 0.121 
Education of the HHH 0.021(.02) 0.398 
Land status (Owner 
mortgaged land) 
-0.076(0.05) 0.174 
Land status ( Owner cum 
tenant owned land) 
-0.033(0.04) 0.400 
Land status (Owner cum 
tenant mortgaged land) 
-0.070 (0.08 0.385 
Land status (Owner cum 
tenant share cropped land) 
-0.140 (0.04) 0.001*** 
Land status (Tenant share 
cropped land) 
0.030 (0.07) 0.651 
Family member 0.012(0.07) 0.853 
Ln farm size -0.048(0.03) 0.086* 
Ln off- farm income -0.001(0.003) 0.666 
Credit 0.188(0.06) 0.004*** 
Adaptation of new crop 0.038(0.09) 0.670 
Extension services  0.033(0.04) 0.453 
Value of asset -0.027 (0.01) 0.034** 
Livestock -0.008(0.01) 0.435 
Cons 0.081(0.33) 0.803 
Note: Number of observation: 222 LR chi2 (15) 51.97*** Figures in the parentheses indicate 
Std. Err.  ***, ** and * Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively  
 
6.4 Conclusion and recommendation 
In this study technical efficiency of different categories of cultivated land of the farmers was 
estimated in stochastic frontier approach and analyzed the estimated technical efficiency using 
ANOVA.  
It is found that there was a statistically significant differences from zero in the level of 
technical efficiency in their cultivated various categories of lands of the owner, owner cum 
tenant and tenant farmers. This technical efficiency becomes higher in share cropped lands if 
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input cost is shared by the land owner.  It was also identified the impact of socioeconomic 
variables on technical efficiency employing Tobit regression analysis; it was found 
significantly positive influence of credit on technical efficiency.  
From the discussions it can be discerned that, there is a potentiality for the enhancement of 
technical efficiency in share cropped lands in ensuring the input cost sharing provision 
according to legal provision of land reform ordinance 1984 in cultivation of share cropped 
lands and extending to ensure the collateral right of rented land for the tenant farmers in 
proper implementation of the land reform ordinance 1984 to make their access in getting 
credit from formal sources. That will lead to attain higher technical efficiency in share 
cropped lands of the tenant farmers. Improvement of more credit facilities for the owner as 
well as owner cum tenant farmers, will lead to enhance their higher technical efficiency also. 
This study recommends the government to take necessary measures on that direction.  
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Chapter7. Summary Conclusion and Recommendation 
 
7.1 Summary 
Land is one of the very important factors of production in an agrarian developing country like 
Bangladesh. Land reform ordinance 1984, the existing legal provision was formulated and 
declared by the government of Bangladesh in due respect for the improvement of agricultural 
production as well as the proper utilization of agricultural lands in the country by properly 
addressing the tenancy issue of share cropped land. The academic contribution of this thesis 
lies in evaluation of implementation and agricultural production aspect of this land reform 
ordinance 1984, which is a very important issue in the national perspective of Bangladesh. 
The aim of this thesis is to analyze the various aspects of land tenure arrangements on 
agricultural production based on with and without implementation of this legal provision of 
land reform ordinance 1984. The study area was selected at Basail Upzila (sub -district) of 
Tangail district in Bangladesh, as the farmers of this Upazila get location advantages in 
farming those can represent the various regional characteristics of land tenure arrangements in 
the country, including cropping patterns and other concerned issues in terms of land tenure 
and rented land in farming. Other related aspects those effects on land tenure and agricultural 
production were also assessed. Data for this study were collected from 150 respondents of 
equally 50 from each category of owner, owner cum tenant and tenant farmers. This data were 
collected from January to March, 2013 by stratified random sampling technique based on the 
cultivated crops in a cropping year. Then the collected data were analyzed by statistical 
analytical software Stata 13 according to the objectives of the study. There are two core 
chapters (Chapter 5 and 6) have been incorporated in this thesis. These include analyses of 
various aspects of agricultural production according to land tenure arrangements and existing 
technical efficiency of the farmers in the cultivated various categories of land of the farmers. 
This Thesis has attempted to locate the most relevant theoretical models to explain the 
econometric outcomes in the relevant chapters to attain concerned target. The earlier chapters 
established the relationship between agricultural production and various aspects of land tenure 
arrangements. Land issues aspects of Bangladesh as well as study area have been explained in 
these chapters. 
 In compare to other south Asian countries agriculture plays a dominant part in the overall 
economy of Bangladesh specially, among South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation 
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(SAARC) countries. There are eight countries in SAARC.  This SAARC was formed in 1980 
for the regional co-operation in attaining the economic development among these 8 countries 
of Bangladesh, India, Bhutan, Pakistan, Sri-Lanka, Maldives, Nepal and Afghanistan. It is 
found based on the study (Ahmed, 2012) that agriculture sector contributes for the 4th highest 
(52%) for the employment opportunity in Bangladesh, though the per capita land is lowest 
(0.12 ha) among these SAARC countries. This indicates the necessity of proper land use 
arrangements in Bangladesh.Land is the single most important asset for the livelihood of 
people in Bangladesh and tenancy arrangements are commonly used in order to get access of 
land for the landless poor. This thesis explores agricultural production in the different land 
tenure arrangements based on these various tenancy arrangements among different categories 
of farmers.  
The current agricultural policies are focused on economic restructuring for attaining proper 
agricultural development. This provides the rationale for this research to study land and 
livelihood based on the agricultural production according to different land tenure 
arrangements. Therefore, the first core chapter (chapter 5) attempts to analyze the agricultural 
production in the different land tenure arrangements of Basail Upazila of Tangail district in 
Bangladesh. This study shows that output sharing is conducted according to this legal 
provision of land reform ordinance 1984 but input cost sharing are not practiced accordingly 
in share cropped land. Those lead the tenant farmers in getting lack of proper incentive. That 
is revealed in both benefit cost ratio (BCR) and analysis of variance of net revenue of the 
farmers. From the analysis of variance, it is found that there is a statistically significant 
difference from zero among the net revenue of cultivated various categories of land of the 
owner, owner cum tenant and tenant farmers. Again, BCR in owner cum tenant mortgaged 
land is higher than that of both the owner cum tenant or tenant share cropped land. This 
indicates the potentiality to transform share cropped land into mortgaged land for the 
cultivators.  
The second core chapter (chapter 6) identifies the technical efficiency of different categories 
of land of the farmers. From this study it is found that there is a statistically significant 
difference from zero among the technical efficiency of various categories of cultivated land of 
the farmers. This technical efficiency becomes higher in share cropped lands, if input cost is 
shared by the land owner according to the legal provision of land reform ordinance 1984.  It is 
also found significantly positive influence of credit on this technical efficiency.  
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Owner and owner cum tenant farmers are getting credit from formal sources as they have their 
owned land to use as collateral for getting this credit. But tenant farmers are not getting any 
credit due to lack of collateral, because they do not have their owned land, but according to 
the legal provision of land reform ordinance 1984 tenant farmers should get the collateral 
right of their rented land. Though, this legal provision is prevailing, but presently they are not 
getting this collateral right of their rented land due to lack of proper implementation of this 
legal provision. If this land reform ordinance 1984 is implemented properly then tenant 
farmers will get the collateral right of their rented land that will lead to attain higher technical 
efficiency by receiving credit from formal sources for the tenant farmers. 
 From the analyses, it can be detected that, proper implementation of land reform ordinance 
1984 is needed for achieving the proper incentive in cultivation of share cropped land, 
enhancement of technical efficiency, Profitability in crop cultivation for the cultivators as well 
as for the better outcome of agricultural production in Bangladesh.  
7.2 Conclusion and Recommendation 
 The findings of the study show that output sharing is conducted according to the legal 
provision of land reform ordinance 1984 but input cost sharing is not practiced accordingly in 
share cropped land. Those lead the tenant farmers in lack of proper incentive. That is revealed 
in BCR analysis as well as net revenue analysis in chapter 5. This   BCR was calculated based 
on the gross revenue and total cost of the cultivated different categories of land of the farmers. 
This was calculated in both major cultivated crop- wise and land category wise. From crop- 
wise BCR, it is found that the highest BCR (4.58) is obtained by owner cum tenant farmers in 
cultivation of T. Aman and the lowest BCR (1.49) is obtained by tenant share cropped land in 
HYV Boro cultivation, though HYV Boro is one of the major cultivated crops and yield level 
is also  higher. This is due to high rental cost of share cropped land.  
Again from the land category - wise BCR of the farmers, it is found that the highest BCR 
(4.34) is obtained by owner cum tenant farmers owned land and the lowest BCR (1.65) is 
obtained by tenant share cropped land. But noticeable aspect can be found from obtained BCR 
in owner mortgaged land (2.25) and owner cum tenant mortgaged land (3.71), which are 
higher than tenant share cropped land. This obtained BCR in mortgaged land should be 
compared with tenant share cropped land as owner cum tenant farmers are getting some 
subsidized input in the form of government support, but tenant farmers are unable to get this 
government support as tenant farmers do not have any cultivated owned land. Moreover, BCR 
(3.71) in owner cum tenant mortgaged land is higher than both the cultivated share cropped 
land of the owner cum tenant and tenant farmers. This depicts the profitability to transform 
the share cropped land into mortgaging arrangement for the cultivators. The reasons for the 
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variation of these obtained BCR are due to the factors affecting gross revenue and total cost of 
the farmers. 
  Net revenue (NR) is the net gain from the cultivated land of the farmers (NR=GR-TC), 
where, GR=gross revenue, TC=total cost. In analyzing crop-wise net revenue of the farmers, 
it is found that, in cultivating HYV Boro the highest (BDT 52,933 ha-1) net revenue is 
obtained by owner cum tenant owned land and lowest (BDT 23,323 ha-1) by tenant share 
cropped land. 
 From T. Aman cultivation, the obtained net revenue in owner cum tenant owned land (BDT 
21,181 ha-1) is higher than owner cum tenant share cropped land (BDT 16,248 ha-1).  
Again, from the cultivation of other crops, the highest (BDT 43,341 ha-1) net revenue is 
obtained by owner mortgaged land and the lowest (BDT 10,131 ha-1) by owner owned land. 
 From the land category –wise net revenue of the farmers, it is revealed that the obtained net 
revenue (BDT 58,433 ha-1) in owner operated owned land is higher than owner operated 
mortgaged land (BDT 43,341 ha-1).  
Owner cum tenant operators obtained net revenue (BDT 85,846 ha-1) in owned land is higher 
than both mortgaged (BDT 40,483 ha-1) and share cropped land (BDT 63,641 ha-1). 
 The highest (BDT 85,846 ha-1) net revenue is obtained by owner cum tenant owned land, but 
the lowest (BDT 40,417 ha-1) by the tenant share cropped land.  
 The reasons for the variation in the obtained net revenues are due to purchasing price (whole 
sale and retail price), rental cost and other related issues in farming. 
 From the analysis of variance of the net revenue from the cultivated land of the farmers, it is 
found that there is a statistically significant difference from zero among the net revenue of the 
cultivated different categories of land of the owner, owner cum tenant and tenant farmers. 
Factors related to gross revenue and total cost are responsible for this originated variation in 
the net revenue. 
The second core chapter (chapter 6) identifies the technical efficiency (TE) of different 
categories of cultivated land of the farmers. Stochastic frontier model was used to measure 
this TE of the farmers based on the gross revenue ha-1 in their cultivated different categories 
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of land. In the study area, if seed cost is shared by the land owner, then land owner claimed 
half of the produced by product, but sometimes this half of the produced by-product is 
claimed also based on customary rule (prevailing rule according to custom). For the simplicity 
the price of by-product was not included in calculating gross revenue. This TE is the 
measurement of gross revenue of output ha-1 in the different types of cultivated land of the 
farmers relative to the maximum possible gross revenue of output ha-1 in different types of 
cultivated land of the farmers that can be produced with same cost of input vectors.  It was 
used in a two-step procedure. In first step TE was computed. In the next step, socioeconomic 
variables were regressed against this TE to identify their impact in Tobit regression method. 
Using this Tobit regression is justified as the value of TE is in the range of 0 to 1(Nargis and 
Lee, 2013: Hossain et al., 2013).Though ordinary least square (OLS) regression method is 
widely used approach, but Tobit regression method was  needed to use in this study as Tobit 
regression method is an alternative analysis of approach according to the requirement, there 
are complementary advantages of Tobit method in working with censoring data, moreover 
Tobit method performs more accurately than OLS regression method when data are subject to 
ceiling or floor effect. In using this stochastic frontier model ha-1 human labor cost, power 
tiller cost, seed cost, material cost (cost of fertilizer, insecticides and pesticides), irrigation 
cost and land use cost were taken as explanatory variables.  
The different farming categories are cultivating different categories of land and their 
ownership patterns are also different, due to this land use cost was taken for the owned land 
and mortgaged land based on the cultivated mortgaged land both for owner as well as owner 
cum tenant farmers at the cost rate of their cultivated mortgaged land. But for the share 
cropped land this land use cost was taken at the cost rate of the cultivated share cropped land 
both for owner cum tenant and tenant farmers in the study area.  
Analysis of variance was used to detect the mean difference of technical efficiencies in the 
various cultivated land categories of the farmers. 
 In using the stochastic frontier approach, the significant log likelihood using Wald test 
depicts the fitness of the model (P= 0.0000). Moreover the likelihood ratio test for the absence 
of inefficiency in the model criteria was rejected (P= 0.000). That indicates the satisfactory 
inefficiency effect explained by the model. Marginal effect of the explanatory input variables 
were estimated on gross revenue as a complementary aspect of this analysis. These values of 
marginal effect were used to discuss the effect of the concerned explanatory variable on gross 
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revenue of the farmers considering the effect of other variables constant to get the impact of 
the explanatory variables. Seed (0.052), power tiller (0.481) and irrigation (0.213) had 
positive effect. This indicates that these inputs had positive effect on gross revenue of output 
ha-1. But, human labor (-0.022), material cost (-0.794) and land use cost (-0.002) had negative 
impact on this gross revenue of output ha-1. From the analysis of variance it is found that there 
is a statistically significant difference from zero among the technical efficiency of various 
categories of land of the farmers.  
The highest (57%) technical efficiency is obtained by owner mortgaged land; this highest 
technical efficiency is obtained due to better advantages in farming in owner mortgaged land. 
Again the obtained technical efficiency in the tenant share cropped land is the lowest (32%) 
level among these different categories of cultivated land. This technical efficiency becomes 
higher in share cropped lands if input cost is shared by the land owner according to the legal 
provision of land reform ordinance 1984. 
From the Tobit regression analysis, it is also found significantly positive influence of credit 
on this technical efficiency. 
 In analyzing socioeconomic characteristics of the farmers it is found that the percentage of 
credit facility availing farmers in cultivation of both in owners owned and mortgaged land is 
98%. This percentages of owner cum tenant owned, mortgaged and share cropped land are 
98%, 98% and 94% respectively. But, the percentage of this credit facility availing farmers in 
tenant share cropped land is 0. These tenant farmers are not getting any credit from formal 
sources as they do not have any collateral (due to lack of owned land to use as collateral to get 
credit from formal sources). Though tenant farmers should get collateral right of their rented 
land according to the legal provision of land reform ordinance 1984 (LRB, 1982). From the 
various analyses, it can be detected that there is potentiality to increase the technical 
efficiency by ensuring collateral right of rented land for the tenant farmers to get their 
required credit from formal sources, improvement of more credit facilities for the owner as 
well as owner cum tenant farmers. These necessary measures should be taken by the 
government for the better outcome of agricultural production in Bangladesh.   
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From the above mentioned various analyses on agricultural production according to land 
tenure arrangements, it can be holistically detected that, proper implementation of land reform 
ordinance 1984 is needed for achieving the proper incentive in cultivation of share cropped 
land, enhancement of technical efficiency, Profitability in crop cultivation for the cultivators 
as well as for the required outcome of agricultural production in Bangladesh. This study 
recommends the government to take necessary measures on that vision. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1Category- wise number of the farmers, cropped area and topography-wise 
cultivated land in the Basail Upazila 
Category- wise number of the farmers 
 
Farmers category Number 
Large farmers 1,034 
Medium farmers 4,501 
Small farmers 7,528 
Marginal farmers 7,488 
Landless farmers 6,612 
Total farmers 27,163 
(Source: DAE, 2013) 
 
Cultivated cropped area  
 
Net cropped area: 13,124 ha 
Single cropped area: 3,525 ha 
Double cropped area:  7,041 ha 
Triple cropped area: 2,558 ha 
Total cropped area: 25,281 ha 
  (Source: DAE, 2013) 
Topography- wise cultivated land 
 
High land: 202 ha 
Medium high land: 3,552 ha 
Medium low land: 2,541 ha 
Low land:  5,657 ha 
Very low land   : 1,374 ha    
(Source: DAE, 2013) 
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Appendix 2 Cultivated areas according to major cropping pattern  
Serial 
No. 
Cropping pattern Cultivated 
area (ha) 
Percentage 
Rabi Kharif I Kharif II 
1. HYV Boro Fallow T. Aman 486 3.70 
2.  HYV Boro Fallow Fallow 250 1.90 
3. HYV Boro B. Aman Fallow 5,000 38.09 
4. Mustard HYV Boro B. Aman 4,300 32.76 
5. Mustard HYV Boro T. Aman 200 1.52 
6. Wheat Jute T. Aman 64 0.48 
(Source: DAE, 2013) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
